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INTRODUCTION
"This is the way my generation was taught, "pleaded the judge
by way of asking for mercy. In the realm of courtesy, pleading for
mercy is known as apologizing. In this instance, a federal judge in
Pittsburgh was retreating from having insisted erroneously that a
lawyer appearing in his court was legally required to style herself
"Mrs. "with her husband's surname, rather than following her pref-
erence of "Ms. " with her birth name. Pennsylvania law, as it
turned out, required no such thing.
That the judge's offense was made in an unmannerly way-he
not only presumed to tell the lawyer what her own name was but
intoned "What if I call you 'sweetie,' " and threatened her with
jail-does not shock Miss Manners as much as it should. The emo-
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tional vehemence with which people react to etiquette changes is an
old story to her.
She is, however, increasingly interested in the use of the genera-
tional excuse. When is it valid to plead custom and habit in retain-
ing the etiquette one was brought up on, and when not?
This is not a simple issue. On the one side are people such as
this judge who attempt to prevent the evolution of manners by
bludgeoning others; but there are also people who simply want to do
things the accustomed way without interference. On the other side
are those who want to make sweeping reforms and force them on
everyone, and those who simply invent their own forms and wonder
why others do not understand, let alone employ them.
All over the landscape, there are people v'o are puzzled and
offended by the behavior of others because they are ignorant of old
ways, or of new ones, or of who uses which. Somewhere in the mid-
dle, desperately trying to get everyone simmered down and make order
out of it all, is poor Miss Manners.'
Miss Manners' concern for etiquette may be found in court-
rooms across the state2 and the nation.' In Maryland, a Survey of
the state and federal bench reveals a growing belief that courtroom
customs may be fading.4 One nine-year veteran of the judiciary re-
ports a deterioration of courtroom etiquette particularly among
younger attorneys: "Many do not bother to even rise when address-
ing the court and ... interrupt and argue with [opposing] counsel
1. J. MARTIN, MISS MANNERS' GUIDE FOR THE TURN-OF-THE-MILLENNIUM 9-10 (1989)
[hereinafter J. MARTIN].
2. The author conducted a survey of the Maryland state and federal benches (222
judges) for opinions on courtroom etiquette [hereinafter Survey]. The Survey was
mailed in March of 1989. Sixty-four (or approximately 28%) of the judges responded,
including 28 circuit court judges, 30 district court judges, 6 appellate court judges, and
1 federal judge. In Maryland, the district courts are of limited jurisdiction with de novo
review by the circuit courts, which are trial courts of general jurisdiction. Above those
courts are the Court of Special Appeals and the highest state court, the Maryland Court
of Appeals.
The Survey asked judges to consider whether etiquette rules exist; to cite examples
of behavior that breaches etiquette rules applicable to attorneys, judges, clerks and the
public; and to cite the most common breaches the judge had witnessed in the court-
room.
All Survey responses referred to in this Article are letters, notes, or marginal notes
addressed to the author or notes from interviews of Survey respondents and are on file
at the Maryland Law Review. Conclusions drawn from the Survey are based either on
Survey responses cited individually or on the author's general impressions of the re-
sponses taken as a whole.
3. See infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
4. See supra note 2. "[Tlraditions are fading" among younger attorneys, although
older attorneys rarely break the rules, according to one circuit court judge from Prince
George's County.
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rather than arguing to the court as they should." 5 The decay of eti-
quette results at least in part from ignorance, which is attributable
to the absence of written rules or even orally expressed expectations
outlining commonly accepted standards of courtroom behavior. As
another judge argues, "judges must bear some of the blame for not
being more demanding."6 To the extent that etiquette standards
remain, they vary in degree and form from court to court.7
The landmark 1986 report of the American Bar Association
(ABA) Commission on Professionalism' initiated a national trend
toward improving legal professionalism.9 In recent years, over
5. Survey response, district court judge, Carroll County. In addition, a Baltimore
City circuit court judge responding to the survey commented: "[A]long with society
generally, there is a [decline] in both formality and etiquette in the courtroom. Too
often, especially in the criminal courts, public defenders and prosecutors alike burn out
all too quickly, and with this, comes a sense of 'let's get this over with.' "
6. Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City. One commentator suggests
the same:
After I tried my first cases, when it was still apparent I didn't know what the
hell I was doing, the judges would pull me aside at the end of a case and invite
me into their chambers, and we'd talk about trial practice, about how I should
handle myself in the courtroom. The judges felt that there were standards of
practice in that community and the judges helped the young lawyers who came
into the community to grow into those standards. Judges are too busy today.
D'Alemberte, On Legal Education, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 52-53.
7. The Survey responses show that standards vary according to geographic loca-
tion, a court's level in the judicial system, the individual judge or courtroom, and socio-
economic factors and lifestyles within each jurisdiction. In the smaller counties where
the caseload is typically lighter and a smaller group of lawyers make up the local bar,
judges' responses indicated an attitude of reduced formalism. Based on the author's
experience in the Maryland criminal courts and discussions with a few judges, the
smaller, rural courts do not demand strict etiquette, perhaps because a majority of the
attorneys are well-known by the clerks and judges; lawyers know what is expected of
them; lifestyles are generally less formal; and time pressures are not as significant,
although this may be changing in some rural Maryland jurisdictions as the population
increases. In these districts, the courthouse is a place of familiarity rather than formal-
ity. See infra note 189.
By contrast, in the larger urban courts, judges' responses demanded better eti-
quette from all lawyers as well as from witnesses and the public. In more crowded urban
courtrooms the dockets are significantly larger; there are a greater number of unfamiliar
attorneys who practice before the judges; large numbers of the public attend the court
proceedings; and overall concerns for judicial economy are greater.
8. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ".... IN THE SPIRIT OF
PUBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
(1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM].
9. See Bowser, The Pros of Being a Pro, Trend Toward Enhanced Professionalism Grows,
BAR LEADER, May-June 1989, at 12.
Since the landmark 1986 report by the ABA's Commission on Professionalism,
everyone, it seems, wants to do something about lawyer professionalism.
From Oregon to Massachusetts, bar committees, commissions, task forces
and panels have issued reports, statements, tenets, creeds and codes. These
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twenty-six state and at least thirty-six local bar associations have
conducted studies on professionalism or adopted codes of profes-
sional conduct.'" In addition, two sections of the ABA have
adopted their own codes of professionalism."
The self-image of their profession clearly troubles lawyers. 12
For example, the preamble to the Los Angeles County Bar Associa-
documents describe in varying detail how lawyers should comport themselves,
and how best to educate and encourage them to do so.
Id.
10. Id. Most state bar associations have either completed professionalism reports, see
infra note 320 and accompanying text, or adopted professionalism codes. Numerous
state and local bars have officially adopted written codes of professional conduct. Most
of these codes are not limited to courtroom conduct, but also address professionalism
guidelines for practice. See STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONAL-
ISM (May 19, 1989); PULASKI COUNTY (ARK.) BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COUR-
TEsY (1986); Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N, LITIGATION GUIDELINES (Apr. 1989); EL
PASO COUNTY (CoLo.) BAR ASs'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Sept. 13,
1988); HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY (FLA.) BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY
(Dec. 11, 1987); SHREVEPORT (LA.) BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM
(1988); MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASS'N, STATEMENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (Mar. 14,
1988); MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Mar. 16,
1988); HINDS COUNTY (MISS.) BAR ASS'N, PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1988); KANSAS
CITY (Mo.) METROPOLITAN BAR ASS'N, TENETS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (1987); STATE
BAR OF MONTANA, GUIDELINES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN AND AMONG LAWYERS (1986);
AKRON (OHIO) BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (1988); MULTNOMAH
BAR ASS'N (OR.) STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONALISM IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Nov. 1988);
OREGON ASs'N OF DEFENSE COUNSEL & OREGON TRIAL LAWYER'S Ass'N, EFFECTIVE LITI-
GATION AND COST CONTAINMENT GUIDELINES (1988); MEMPHIS AND SHELBY COUNTY
(TENN.) BAR ASs'N, GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL COURTESY AND CONDUCT (1988);
NASHVILLE BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF INTRA-PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Feb. 3, 1987); DAL-
LAS BAR Ass'N, LAWYER'S CREED AND GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Oct. 15,
1987); HOUSTON BAR Ass'N, PROFESSIONALISM: A LAWYER'S MANDATE (1989); TEXAS
TRIAL LAWYERS Ass'N & TEXAS ASS'N OF DEFENSE COUNSEL, LAWYER'S CREED (June
1989); VIRGINIA STATE BAR, PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (1988).
11. See SECTION OF TORTS & INSURANCE PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S
CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (1988); YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
LAWYERS' PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1988). In addition to the state and American
Bar Association codes, in 1988 the American Board of Trial Attorneys adopted the At-
torney's 10-point Pledge on Courtesy.
12. Jill Nicholson, of the ABA, states that professionalism is a "pervasive societal
problem" and "partly a self-image" problem of lawyers. Once lawyers improve their
own self-image and feel better about themselves and the profession, she says, matters
should improve. Nicholson maintains that the national trend of studying declining pro-
fessionalism is a very healthy process of self-examination; nevertheless, she feels that the
end results of improved professionalism will be difficult to gauge. Telephone interview
with Jill Nicholson, Professionalism Counsel, of the ABA Special Coordinating Commit-
tee on Professionalism (Feb. 5, 1991).
See also McKay, The Road Not Traveled, Charting the Future for Law, Law Schools and
Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 76, 77 (suggesting lawyers should stop worrying about
"image" and focus instead on providing competent legal services that will take care of
the negative public perception).
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tion's Litigation Guidelines states that relations between lawyers,
particularly litigation attorneys, have deteriorated to the point that
"our profession nears a crisis."'" This local bar association and
others have adopted litigation guidelines to govern attorneys' con-
duct outside of court as well as in the courtroom. 14 Indeed, court-
room etiquette is a significant component in the movement to
improve the general state of professionalism in the practice of law.
This Article will focus on courtroom etiquette, identifying the
theoretical and practical justifications for establishing written eti-
quette standards for court proceedings. In addition, it will discuss
the state of etiquette in Maryland courtrooms as revealed by a sur-
vey of Maryland judges.15
In 1990, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted a requirement
that bar applicants attend a one-day course on professionalism as a
condition precedent to Maryland Bar admission.' 6 Responsibility
for developing the course lies with the Maryland State Bar Associa-
tion's Standing Committee on Professionalism.' 7 Rule 11 of Mary-
land's rules governing admission to the bar provides that the
professionalism course will be offered for three years and, upon
evaluation by the Court of Appeals, may be extended thereafter.' 8
This Article will argue that, although Maryland's new mandatory
course on professionalism is a laudable attempt to remedy declining
professionalism in the bar, it is targeted at the wrong group of peo-
13. Los ANGELES CouNTY BAR Ass'N, LITIGATION GUIDELUNES preamble (adopted
Apr. 1989) (guidelines focus primarily on pretrial communications between lawyers, in-
cluding depositions, written memoranda, motions, settlements and trials).
14. See id Two guidelines govern lawyers at trials and hearings: "Counsel should be
punctual and prepared for any court appearance [and] ... Counsel should always deal
with parties, counsel, witnesses, jurors or prospective jurors, court personnel and the
judge with courtesy and civility." Id. § 12.
15. See supra note 2.
16. See RuLEs GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND Rule 11 (a) (1991).
Before admission to the Bar, a person recommended for admission pursuant to
Rule 10 shall complete a course on legal professionalism. For good cause
shown, the Court of Appeals may admit a person who has not completed the
course provided that the person represents to the Court that he or she will
complete the next regularly scheduled course.
Id. The course will be offered twice annually after bar admission and prior to the admis-
sion ceremonies. A course fee covering costs may be charged to admittees. See id. rule
11 (b).
17. See id. rule 11 (b). Edward F. Shea, Jr., is currently Chair of the Standing Commit-
tee on Professionalism. The Committee is charged with creating a course curriculum,
which is subject to final approval by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Daily Record,
May 1, 1989, at BI.
18. See RuLEs GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND Rule 11 (c) (1991).
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pie at an inappropriate time in their professional development.' 9
Following the lead of other state bar associations, the Maryland
State Bar Association's professionalism committee is also develop-
ing professional courtesy guidelines. The Maryland guidelines of
professional conduct will supplement the Maryland Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct2" and serve as aspirational standards for Maryland
lawyers. 2 ' While the primary responsibility to teach courtroom eti-
quette lies with the law schools, 2 published guidelines set forth
both by the courts and by bar associations will supplement efforts to
improve courtroom conduct. The more members of the legal com-
munity shedding light on courtroom etiquette, the better. Untaught
and unlearned rules serve only to frustrate both the bench and bar.
I. A REVIVAL OF LEGAL ETIOUET'E IN AMERICA
Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, bar journals and
law reviews notably increased the number of articles they published
on professionalism or legal etiquette. 2- This interest in such issues
19. See infra subsection V(A)(3)(b) and accompanying notes.
20. The Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct define responsibilities that are
more intrinsically legal than they are responsibilities of etiquette. Toward opponents,
the Rules require a general standard of fairness. See MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1991). Maryland lawyers may not obstruct access to evidence by
destruction or concealment, falsify evidence, instruct witnesses to lie, or make frivolous
discovery requests. Id. rule 3.4 (a), (d).
Toward a tribunal, the Rules proscribe conduct that threatens its impartiality and
decorum. For example, Maryland trial lawyers shall not
allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or
that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of
facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as
to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil
litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused ....
Id. rule 3.4(e) (1991).
In addition, lawyers may not seek to influence a judge, juror or other official, com-
municate with a juror outside of trial, communicate ex parte, or "engage in conduct in-
tended to disrupt a tribunal." Id. rule 3.5 (a)(l)-(8).
21. Violations will probably not be sanctioned and should not be sanctioned as are
violations of the ethical code; rather, the courtesy guidelines will serve as aspirational
standards. See The Daily Record, May 1, 1989, at BI.
22. The ABA Committee on Professionalism notes: "We begin our recommenda-
tions with law schools, not because they represent the profession's greatest problems,
but because they constitute our greatest opportunities." COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL-
ISM, supra note 8, at 15.
23. See, e.g., Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, 54 A.B.A.J. 121 (1968)
(proposing specific ideas on how to bridge the gap between the public and private divi-
sions of the bar); The Necessity for Civility, Remarks of the Hon. Warren E. Burger, Chief
Justice of the United States, at the opening session of the American Law Institute, re-
printed in 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971) (the necessity of civility in the legal arena); Hazard, Secur-
ing Courtroom Decorum, 80 YALE LJ. 433 (1971) (discussing the Report of the Committee
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began after tumultuous trials on politically sensitive issues sug-
gested a decline in public respect for the judicial system. Among
the most notorious of these trials was the prosecution of the so-
called "Chicago Seven" for allegedly inciting riots at the 1968
Democratic National Convention.24 The courtroom antics of the
defendants included giving clenched fist salutes to the jury; wearing
judicial robes in court; blowing kisses to the jury; trying to drape
counsel table with flags; parading into court with a birthday cake;
and shouting numerous derogatory and obscene comments at the
judge. The judge ordered some of the defendants bound and
gagged and held all of them in contempt of court.25 In fact, the
defendants amassed 121 contempt citations during their four-month
trial, and two of their attorneys, Leonard I. Weinglass and William
M. Kunstler, also received thirty-eight contempt of court citations. 6
More recently, members of the legal profession have renewed
their demands for stricter standards governing conduct. 27 Numer-
on Disruption of the Judicial Process of the American College of Trial Lawyers; the
Report of the Advisory Committee on the Judge's function; and their proposed rules);
Karlen, Disorder in the Courtroom, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 996 (1971) (discussing how a repeti-
tion of what happened in the Chicago trial can be avoided in the future); Wright, Court-
room Decorum and the Trial Process, 51 JUDICATURE 378 (1968) (discussing judicial methods
for controlling the courtroom from the early stages of opening court sessions through
closing arguments); Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 6 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1970); Note, Misconduct ofJudges and Attorneys During Trial, 49 IOWA
L. REV. 531 (1964) (examining the in-court misconduct of attorneys and judges and the
various sanctions available to the courts).
24. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972). For a full discussion of the "Chi-
cago Seven" trials, see SPECIAL COMM. ON COURTROOM CONDUCT, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, DISORDER IN THE COURT 56-63 (1973); see also Comment, Invok-
ing Summary Criminal Contempt Procedures-Use or Abuse? United States v. Dellinger-The 'Chi-
cago Seven' Contesnpts, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1549 (1971) (discussing the development of
contempt law and judicial approaches to direct criminal contempt).
25. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 374 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[Seale's] contin-
ued disruptive conduct made it necessary for the first time within the experience of this
court to physically and forcibly restrain him").
26. Kunstler was cited twenty-four times and received a sentence of four years and
thirteen days. Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 402. Weinglass was cited a total of fourteen times
and received a sentence of one year, eight months and five days. Id. at 403. In 1972, the
Seventh Circuit reversed all 159 contempt citations issued against the defendants and
attorneys on the ground that the judge erred by waiting until the end of the trial to
punish the defendants and lawyers. See id. at 396-97.
27. Compare Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L.
REV. 629 (1972) with articles cited infra notes 28-29. Professor Alschuler examined in
1972 the misconduct of prosecutors and trial judges and concluded that the existing
mechanisms for disciplining such misconduct were largely ineffective. He urged that it
was time to reconsider the system as a whole. See id. at 735. See also Lawyers Object to
Colleagues' Rudeness, Wall St. J., June 24, 1991, at BI, col. 1 ("[L]awyers and judges la-
ment how a profession once characterized by mutual respect and lasting relationships
has become marked by increasingly abrasive confrontations.").
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ous attorneys"8 and judges29 have written articles calling for the de-
velopment of rules of conduct or lawyers' codes of professional
courtesy. Moreover, stern responses from the bench to alleged acts
of impropriety show the gravity of concern. For example, a Penn-
28. Principles of Professional Courtesy, VA. LAw., July 1, 1989, at 29. Article II of Vir-
ginia's professional courtesy code goes so far as to state that lawyers in courtrooms
should "make it a practice to shake hands with opposing counsel at the conclusion of a
trial." Id. See also Hazard, Change Rules to 'Civilize' the Profession, Nat'l LJ., Apr. 17, 1989,
at 13, col. 3 (discussing the call for civility emerging in the legal profession); Martin,
Collegiality: You Mean I Have to Act Like a Human Being???, 20 ARK. LAw. 166 (1986) (dis-
cussing suggestions for restoring collegiality among practicing attorneys). In George, A
Plea for Civility: Lawyer's 10-Point Pledge, TRIAL, May 1988, at 65, the author suggested the
following pledge:
(1) I will treat other lawyers with respect;
(2) I will return phone calls;
(3) I will not be tardy for court or for appointments;
(4) I will prepare my case fully in advance;
(5) I will cooperate with my opponent as much as possible;
(6) I will scrupulously observe all mutual understandings;
(7) I will never take cheap shots;
(8) I will stand in court when asking a question, local rules and traditions
permitting;
(9) I will not interrupt or raise my voice to a judge;
(10) I will know the rules of court and follow them.
Id. See also Reiter, Whatever Happened to Professional Courtesy?, 64 FLA. B.J. 4 (1987), recom-
mending eight standards of professional courtesy:
(1) attorneys should treat each other, the opposing party, the court and
the members of the court staff with courtesy and civility and conduct them-
selves in a professional manner at all times;
(2) attorneys should consult with opposing counsel before scheduling
hearings and depositions in a good faith attempt to avoid scheduling conflicts;
(3) notice of cancellation of hearings and depositions should be given to
the court and opposing counsel at the earliest possible time;
(4) proposed orders to be submitted to the court should be prepared
promptly, and proposed orders on a nonroutine matter should be submitted to
opposing counsel before being submitted to the court;
(5) attorneys should cooperate with each other when conflicts and calen-
dar changes are necessary and requested;
(6) except where any material right of the client is involved, counsel
should stipulate to matters in order to avoid unnecessary hearings;
(7) when scheduling hearings, counsel should attempt to secure suffi-
cient time to allow full presentation and to allow opposing counsel equal time
in response;
(8) reasonable extensions of time should be granted to opposing counsel
where such extension will not have a material adverse effect on the rights of the
client.
Id.; see Briggs, El Paso County Bar Association Standards of Professional Courtesy, 18 COLO.
LAw. 213 (Feb. 1989) (presenting standards proposed by a committee and unanimously
adopted at the annual meeting of the bar).
29. Can Good Lawyers Be Nice People?, BARRISTER, Summer 1989, at 34 (quoting United
States Judge Sidney Allen Fitzwater's advice on how to increase professionalism in
American trial advocacy).
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sylvania trial judge cited an attorney for contempt and fined him
$2000 for his derogatory remark about the judge. The remark had
been made out-of-court.3 °
Courts generally are reluctant to impose formal rules of court-
room decorum. Texas presents the exception. In an unprece-
dented en banc opinion, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas denounced "hardball" trial tactics and
adopted the Dallas Bar Association's Guidelines of Professional
Courtesy and its Lawyer's Creed.3 Both are rules of courtesy that
go beyond the code of professional conduct and "basically define
the lowest common denominator acceptable to professional per-
formance."32
Some prefer to leave the development of these courtesy codes
to local bar associations3 3 and the ABA rather than to courts, fear-
ing satellite litigation similar to the wave of rule 11 litigation.34
Many of the recently drafted professional courtesy codes address
30. Moffatt v. Buano (In re Garbett), 391 Pa. Super. 1, 569 A.2d 968 (1990). A court-
room administrator overheard the attorney call the judge an "asshole" and reported it
to the judge. Upon entering the courtroom, the judge ordered the lawyer to repeat his
comment, which he did. The judge then held the lawyer in contempt of court and or-
dered him committed to the county jail. The lawyer was given an opportunity to apolo-
gize. Because the lawyer did not apologize directly to the court, the court continued to
sentence him to jail. The court immediately proceeded to hold a contempt hearing.
The lawyer was ordered to pay a fine of $2,000. The Pennsylvania Superior Court later
revoked both the fine and citation, holding that an attorney who made an offensive refer-
ence to a judge in a courtroom hallway could not be held in contempt where there was
no evidence that the remark was made with the intent of obstructing justice or that it
actually obstructed justice. Id. at 970.
See also Commonwealth v. Restifo, 330 Pa. Super. 225, 229, 488 A.2d 633, 635
(1985) ("Mere affront [or]. .. [r]emarks that are injudicious, or even disrespectful, will
not, without more, justify a summary conviction for contempt of court.").
31. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284
(N.D. Tex. 1988). The court adopted the Dallas Bar Association's Guidelines of Profes-
sional Courtesy, and warned that violations would provoke sanctions. The sanctions
range from a simple warning on the record to money sanctions, or compulsory legal
education. For a fuller discussion of this case, see The Daily Record, May 1, 1989, at B1,
col. 1; Good Manners Mandated, Litigation News, Dec. 1988, at 1.
32. Good Manners Mandated, supra note 31, at 1 (quoting Robert B. Cummings of Chi-
cago, Ill., co-chair of the professional responsibility committee) (emphasis added).
33. In 1986, the Little Rock, Arkansas Bar Association was the nation's first to draft a
courtesy code. See The Daily Record, May 1, 1989, at BI, col. 1. Other state bar associa-
tions have since adopted their own versions, as well as sections of the American Bar
Association and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. See, e.g., supra notes 10 and
11 and accompanying text.
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Good Manners Mandated, supra note 31, at 7 (Ste-
phen R. Steinberg, Chair of the ABA Trial Practice Committee, asserts that courts
should make decisions about attorney conduct on a case-by-case basis and only when
these groups fail to act).
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out-of-court etiquette breaches, perhaps the "lesser-included of-
fense" of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. s5 Nev-
ertheless, as the Texas and Pennsylvania cases show, judges are not
likely to remain silent on issues of courtroom etiquette.36
The discussion that follows addresses only in-court etiquette
standards and;omits out-of-court etiquette problems. Indeed, the
latter is intertwined with these in-court behavioral standards and
both issues constitute an escalating concern to attorneys and
judges.3 7 The distinction, however, between in-court and out-of-
court etiquette breaches is made for the purpose of considering the
usefulness of courtroom etiquette expected of litigators. In-court
breaches may have a more immediate and direct impact on a client's
representation than out-of-court breaches because they occur
before the trier of fact. Often attorneys may be unaware that their
in-court conduct violates principles of etiquette-particularly when
a judge concludes that such behavior is of minor concern and thus
35. For example, Article II of Virginia's recently adopted Principles of Professional
Courtesy, which addresses courtesy toward other counsel, is divided into two sections.
See Virginia State Bar, Principles of Professional Courtesy art. 11 (1988). As far as con-
duct outside of court, the provision states that "[a] lawyer should return telephone calls
and respond to written communications in a timely [manner]." Id. It also sets forth
rules governing lawyers' conduct specifically inside the courtroom. E.g., supra note 28.
36. The Supreme Court of Texas was the nation's first state court of last resort to
adopt a code of professionalism for all attorneys practicing in the state. It was at an ABA
convention, wrote Justice Eugene A. Cook, that he
learned that the decrease in professionalism was the largest single problem fac-
ing the profession and existed from New York to Seattle to Los Angeles to
West Palm Beach. This was the topic that lawyers wanted to talk about and
wanted to address. We are addressing the problem and we intend to do some-
thing about it.
Cook, The Search for Professionalism, 52 TEX. B.J. 1302 (1989).
For other instances of the bench's interest in the lawyers' conduct, see Samborn,
Taming the Loose Cannons, Nat'l LJ., Jan. 15, 1990, at 1, col. 3 (discussing the Judicial
Conference of the Seventh United States Circuit Court of Appeals' survey). An ad hoc
Committee on Civility surveyed over 1500 litigators and judges in three states-Illinois,
Indiana, and Wisconsin-after a significant number of complaints from judges and attor-
neys about professional conduct. The Seventh Circuit survey is litigation-oriented and
defines civility as " 'the professional conduct in litigation proceedings ofjudicial person-
nel and attorneys. The term is not limited to good manners or social grace.'" Id. at 22,
col. 1.
37. For example, in Colorado, the El Paso County Bar Association Standards of Pro-
fessional Courtesy and a call for civility across the state were caused by "[t]he wolverine
approach to the practice of law under the guise of aggressive representation .... The
courts and individual lawyers have decried lawyers' refusal to cooperate in settling mat-
ters and in facilitating discovery as well as their making of personal derogatory comment
at depositions." Briggs, supra note 28, at 213. There were other specific problems high-
lighted by the bar association in that lawyers did not return phone calls and were ver-
bally abusive to over-worked court clerks and law office employees. Id.
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does not bring it to the attention of the attorneys committing the
breach. Recurring breaches of etiquette before a judge potentially
harm the litigant in the long run, because they may aggravate the
judge to the extent that her judgment on the case's merits is uncon-
sciously affected. Aristotle wrote:
When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think
one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile,
they think either something totally different or the same
thing with a different intensity: when they feel friendly to
the man who comes before them for judgment, they regard
him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hos-
tile, they take the opposite view.38
Out-of-court breaches of etiquette include abuses of the discov-
ery process (including misrepresentations to opposing counsel and
concealing relevant information, particularly in settlement negotia-
tions), inappropriate motions practice, uncooperativeness in pre-
trial preparations for a case,39 and ex parte communications.4 ° Con-
sistent patterns of misconduct out-of-court could conceivably
amount to violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility or
Model Rules. 4 1 In contrast to in-court breaches, these issues may be
handled through discovery sanctions, contempt of court orders, and
other systemic means.42 All states have court rules or laws provid-
ing an avenue for attorney disciplining such as state bar disciplinary
boards.43 For example, in a case involving one attorney's out-of-
38. ARISTOTLE, BK. 1, CH. 15, RHETORIC II *1377b 32.
39. One judge responded that etiquette in court is "usually good," although he dis-
tinguished out-of-court etiquette breaches that occur: "errant problems arise at deposi-
tions or settlement conferences." Survey response, circuit court judge, Anne Arundel
County.
40. See, e.g., Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR Ass'N, LITIGATION GUIDELINES (1989). Also,
in Houston: "A lawyer owes opposing counsel courtesy, candor, cooperation in all re-
spects not inconsistent with a client's interest, and scrupulous observance of all mutual
agreements and understandings. Ill feelings between clients should not influence a law-
yer's conduct, attitude, or demeanor toward opposing lawyers." HOUSTON BAR Ass'N,
PROFESSIONALISM: A LAWYER'S MANDATE (1989). The mandate then lists seven guide-
lines for appropriate pre-trial conduct in filing motions, pleadings, discovery, deposi-
tions, and business transactions. See id.
41. DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5) and DR 7-101(A)(I), 1989 Selected Standards on Profes-
sional Responsibility. See Model Rules 3.4; Rule 4.1(a) and 8.4(a), (c), (d). See also infra
notes 42-44. The ABA Commission Report at 42-43 states: "There is widespread rec-
ognition that, in appropriate cases, sanctions should be used to penalize baseless filings,
dilatory tactics and deter similar misconduct .... "
42. A repetitive course of in-court misconduct could likewise arise to contempt of
court. See infra Part III, discussing misconduct as contempt of court versus a breach of
etiquette.
43. See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE (1990) (establishing the Ala-
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court verbal abuse of an adversary, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals wrote that "[a] potential mechanism available to deal
with outrageous conduct by a lawyer ... may be the policing func-
tion of the bar disciplinary committee." 44 Lodging a complaint with
the bar against counsel who has repeatedly been abusive out-of-
court saves the court time and resources, which are ill-spent on the
complex and far-reaching problems of attempting to modify an at-
torney's overall professional behavior and relationships with other
attorneys. In terms of judicial economy, therefore, courts are best
left to deciding the substantive legal issues presented and maintain-
ing control over the courtroom proceedings. Serious out-of-court
bama Supreme Court's jurisdiction to handle violations of either the attorney's oath of
office or the Code of Professional Responsibility, whether or not the act or omission
occurred during the course of the attorney-client relationship. The Rules also provide
for a state bar disciplinary board, a disciplinary commission and procedures for lodging
complaints); ARK. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.3 (1988) (stating that lawyers must maintain the
integrity of the profession by reporting professional misconduct where there is a sub-
stantial question as to a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6077 (West 1990) (willful breach of the Rules of
Professional Conduct must be reported to the board, which has the power to discipline
members of the bar by reproval, public or private, or to recommend to the Supreme
Court suspension for not more than three years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-90 (West
Supp. 1990) (establishing a state-wide grievance committee of fifteen persons with du-
ties to adopt rules of procedure and rules for grievance panels, to investigate and to
present to the proper court "any person deemed in contempt .... " (emphasis added));
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2502 (1989) (vesting the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
with the authority to "censure, suspend from practice or expel a member of its bar for
crime, misdemeanor, fraud, deceit, malpractice, professional misconduct, or conduct
prejudicial to the administration ofjustice."); HAW. S. CT. R. ANN. 2.4 (1991) (establish-
ing the Disciplinary Board of the Hawaii Supreme Court with the authority to investigate
"any alleged grounds for discipline or alleged incapacity of any attorney called to its
attention, or upon its own motion, and to take such action with respect thereto as shall
be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of these Disciplinary Rules."); INDIANA RULES
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND THE DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS R.23 (Burns 1991) (estab-
lishing disciplinary commission and grounds for discipline or suspension for violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct and stating that attorneys licensed in Indiana are
obliged to conduct themselves "at all times in a manner consistent with the trust and
confidence reposed on [them] by this court and in a manner consistent with [their] du-
ties and responsibilities as an officer or judge of the courts of this state"); TEX. GOVT.
CODE ANN. § 81.030-064 (Vernon 1986) (grievance committee established to investi-
gate and discipline attorneys for misconduct); Wis. S. CT. R. ANN. 21.01 to 21.15 (West
1990) (creating the position of a Professional Responsibility Administrator and requir-
ing that the state bar divide the state into districts with a professional responsibility
committee in each district to investigate possible attorney misconduct).
44. Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1988) (tenant's attorney's allegedly slander-
ous remarks about landlord's attorney fell within the absolute privilege for judicial pro-
ceedings). In the hearing room, with clients present but before the hearing officer had
arrived, the attorney said to his opponent, a native of India, "You don't understand the
law. Where did you go to law school[?]; you should go back to law school before you
practice law .... You better learn your English, go to elementary school." Id. at 622.
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disobedience or misconduct by members of the bar is an issue better
left with state bar associations and disciplinary committees in the
event that court sanctions or contempt orders are ineffective.
II. WHAT IS COURTROOM ETIQUETrE, AND Is IT IMPORTANT TO
LEGAL REPRESENTATION?
The etymological origins of the word "etiquette" are the Ger-
man variant of the term "stechen," which means "stick," with em-
phasis on the notion "to impale" or "to embroider."'45 In time, the
terminology evolved into the medieval French terms "estiquet or
estiquette," meaning "a label."46 In the 1700s, labels implied a cer-
tain order, which developed into the modern meaning of "court
ceremonial, hence formal good manners. ' 47 Modem references to
etiquette, however, generally conjure up images of Miss Manners and
Emily Post.48 Thus, some may view etiquette rules as paleolithic
rules of formality typically followed by people with a "high sense of
occasion" who have nothing better to do than to follow these ritual-
istic behaviors at the appropriate time and place.49
Contemporary Western philosophers have devoted relatively
little attention to etiquette, despite its prominence in classical antiq-
uity.50 Although "Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism share the
view that etiquette is inseparable from morality,"' for purposes of
analyzing courtroom etiquette specifically, etiquette will not be con-
45. See E. PARTRIDGE, A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH 188,
668 (1963).
46. Id at 668. The French derivation of this reference to a label later evolved into
the current English meaning of the word "etiquette."
47. Id.
48. See E. POST, EMILY POST'S ETIQUETTE (12th ed. 1969).
49. "The richness of civilized society depends on the ability to understand the sub-
tleties of context, to manage more than one style of behavior, and to have a high sense
of occasion. Knowing how to behave is only part of the struggle. One must also know
when and where." J. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 11.
50. In the nineteenth century, a relatively small amount of information on legal eti-
quette rules existed, appearing primarily in English, New Zealand, and Australian publi-
cations. See, e.g., W. BOULTON, A GUIDE TO CONDUCT AND ETIQUETTE AT THE BAR OF
ENGLAND AND WALES (6th ed. 1975) (discussing forms of address, decorum, and general
principles of legal etiquette in the four levels of the British court system); Simon of
Glaisdale, My Learned Friend, 59 LAw INST. J. 1223 (Nov. 1985) (discussing British legal
etiquette codes); Sullivan, Practice Direction-District Courts, 1980 NEW ZEALAND L.J. 147
(discussing legal etiquette in the courts of New Zealand). Few contemporary American
scholars have devoted their efforts to the topic of etiquette in society. See Martin &
Stent, I Think, Therefore I Thank-A Philosophy of Etiquette, 59 AM. SCHOLAR 237 (1990)
(discussing the relationship between morality, law, and etiquette).
51. Martin & Stent, supra note 50, at 237.
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sidered here as moral, value-laden guidelines.52 Social etiquette
may be defined broadly as standards for outward human behavior
based on normative rules for social conduct that are generally ac-
cepted among members of society.5" Courtroom etiquette, how-
ever, is more narrowly defined as a code of behavior for attorneys
and judges. That code not only incorporates overall concerns for
good manners and politeness, but also extends to the human inter-
action within the confines of a courtroom setting and focuses on
professionalism as a positive goal to be achieved when lawyers con-
form to the etiquette.54 Courtroom etiquette is a code of profes-
sional behavior designed by and for lawyers.55
The premise that professionalism is a positive good to be
achieved should not be accepted without question. Specifically, is
the current quest for professionalism a move toward manipulative
role-playing and therefore potentially harmful to society? To some
scholars, anti-professionalism is the goal because professionalism is
a form of abuse by those members of society who justify their special
status based on "cognitive exclusiveness."5 6 In other words, those
with the special status have unique access to an area of knowledge
that is critical to society's overall well-being and they block the rest
of society from this information to secure their position in society.57
This form of professional abuse has been said to be "typified by the
behavior of lawyers ' 58 who are entrusted with the discovery and
protection of truth. In reality, the critics of professionalism claim,
lawyers deliberately obfuscate the truth by using procedural strata-
gems in their craft (such as etiquette). In the process, justice and
the general welfare are sacrificed to the special interests of the legal
52. "Well-mannered persons can be outrageous criminals.... But while all well-
mannered folks are not necessarily moral, all moral folks are usually well-mannered."
Brown, Narcissism, Manners, and Morals: Can Grace and Collegiality Be Salvaged?, LITIGATION,
Winter 1987, at 17.
53. Martin & Stent, supra note 50, at 245, 248; see also Kelsen, The Dynamic Aspect of
Law, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross, eds. 1975) (discussing law as a
normative order).
54. Indeed, the ABA Commission on Professionalism noted in its preface that in-
creased professionalism is the major goal of its effort to improve the public's perception
of lawyers. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 8, at v.
55. "Etiquette of the [legal] profession" is defined as the "code of honor agreed on
by mutual understanding and tacitly accepted by members of the legal profession, espe-
cially by the bar." BtACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979). The Survey of Mary-
land judges and the variance among codes of professional conduct demonstrate that
there is no consensus, agreement, or tacit acceptance of one uniform code of honor.
56. M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM 15 (1977).
57. See id.
58. Id.
1991] 959
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
profession. 5 9 The worst casualty of this effort to become a profes-
sional is said to be the person who surrenders his or her values for
false priorities:
The list of casualties left in the wake of professionalism
grows-the client, society, truth, value; but perhaps the
casualty most often lamented in anti-professionalist polem-
ics is the self or soul of the professional himself. For it fol-
lows that if a profession has given itself over to hypocrisy,
secrecy, expansion for expansion's sake, mindless speciali-
zation, and the like, its members have necessarily surren-
dered their values and ideals to these same false
priorities .... [I]n the act of becoming a professional one
is in danger of losing his very humanity.'
The countervailing assessment of the legal profession's quest
for greater professionalism-which necessarily includes etiquette
standards to create and guide professionals' conduct-is that it is
not a destructive process that transforms lawyers into vessels of
"empty and self-serving careerism." 6 ' Enforcement of legal eti-
quette rules instead may be viewed as constructive beyond securing
lawyers' professional position in society: it also promotes fairness
and efficiency in the search for truth.62
Most children are taught through literature that good manners
and social normative rules of behavior play a role in how we view a
society, its members, and the sophistication of society's governance
scheme. For example, in the infamous courtroom scene in Alice in
Wonderland,6" disorder and chaos prevailed over the proceedings.
The litigants broke unknown, often-changing rules of decorum and
59. See S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRAC-
TICE OF THEORY IN LITERACY AND LEGAL STUDIES 216 (1989).
60. Id. at 216-17.
61. Id. at 217.
62. Etiquette is not a destructive tool of the profession, but rather promotes individ-
ual and collective fairness. Moreover, realists assert that etiquette promotes efficiency
by limiting the use of judicial resources in the adjudicatory process. See Wilkins, Legal
Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990).
To predict the operation of legal rules, a lawyer must consider the entire range
of factors that might bear on actual outcomes, including the difficulty of de-
tecting breaches in rules, the amount of resources committed to enforcement,
and the personal biases of decisionmakers. Ifa lawyer is entitled to consider all
these factors in determining the 'bounds of the law,' legal restrictions will be
more malleable and expansive .... This danger is clear with respect to rules of
professional conduct, which tend to be systematically underenforced.
Id. at 492-93.
63. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (Chancellor Press, London,
England (1985)).
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thereby irritated the king, who ordered them-and sometimes their
attorneys-beheaded. 6 Through this scerie from literature, real-
world questions arise: Does rude behavior detract from justice? Or,
to rephrase the question, would more courtesy improve the quality
of justice?65
Differing views exist with respect to the rationale for courtroom
etiquette. Some judges assert that etiquette is essential to the ad-
ministration of justice; others are more concerned with the sub-
stance of courtroom interaction rather than its form.6 6 At least
three theories justify the existence of rules of courtroom etiquette:
(1) preservation of power and professionalism; (2) efficiency; and (3)
fairness. These three theoretical justifications provide a foundation
for the current national movement toward the formal codification of
etiquette and professionalism guidelines. In addition to the theoret-
ical justifications for codification, the practical argument exists that
a broad-based knowledge of legal etiquette is necessary in order for
lawyers to be more effective advocates.
64. Id. at 142-48.
The first witness was the Hatter. He came in with a teacup in one hand and a
piece of bread-and-butter in the other. "I beg pardon, your Majesty," he began,
"for bringing these in; but I hadn't quite finished my tea when I was sent for."
"You ought to have finished," said the King. "When did you begin?"
"Take off your hat," the King said to the Hatter.
"It isn't mine," said the Hatter.
"Stolen!" the King exclaimed, turning to the jury, who instantly made a
memorandum of that fact.
"Give your evidence," said the King; "and don't be nervous, or I'll have
you executed on the spot. ...
"Give your evidence," the King repeated angrily, "or I'll have you exe-
cuted, whether you're nervous or not."
"You may go," said the King; and the Hatter hurriedly left the court, with-
out even waiting to put his shoes on.
"--and just take his head off outside," the Queen added to one of the of-
ficers; but the Hatter was out of sight before the officer could get to the door.
Id.
65. Some judges answering the Survey maintained that strict adherence to rules of
decorum may cause the judicial process to move more slowly and inefficiently.
66. "[D]ecorum is essential to administration of justice even with the heavier work-
load." Survey response, circuit court judge, St. Mary's County. Anotherjudge counters
that "I'm a big believer in substance over form." Survey response, district court judge,
Wicomico County. This comment suggests that etiquette may not be viewed by every-
one as essential to dispensing justice.
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A. Theoretical Justifications for Courtroom Standards
1. Preservation of Power and Professionalism.-A small book enti-
tled A Guide to Conduct and Etiquette at the Bar of England and Wales
offers a very practice-oriented list of the principles governing prac-
tice as a member of the English bar.67 One principle set forth in the
Guide provides: "It is the duty of every member of the Bar at all
times to uphold the dignity and high standing of his profession, and
his own high standing as a member of it."68 How this duty applies
in practice is unclear; nevertheless, all who read it appreciate the
significance of the words. A familiar justification for codification of
etiquette standards is that rules preserve professionalism and the
power structure.69 In other words, courts are respected if they are
respectable. Society allocates decisional authority and its functions
to the authorities that it accepts. Etiquette is a bridge to acceptance.
Etiquette rules arguably engender the public respect that allows
the court system to work. Images of professionalism, competence,
dignity and impartiality fortify the impression of truth. Basic norms
are presupposed to be valid, "not because they are effective; but
they are valid only as long as this legal order is effective .... A legal
order is regarded as valid if its norms are by and large effective (that
is, actually applied and obeyed)." 7 Thus, ajudgment is enforceable
only if people believe it is true, and not simply because a judge has
power.7 In the Survey of Maryland judges, respondents wrote that
attorneys, parties, witnesses, and police who talk and laugh while
other cases proceed, breach etiquette by undermining the dignity
and respect for the proceedings.7 Trial lawyers must act in a re-
spectful manner toward the court because if they show disrespect
for judges and for the system, so will the public.7" "Any of these
67. W. BOULTON, supra note 50, at 6-7.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Wilkins, supra note 62, at 471 (discussing the traditional model of legal ethics
that asserts lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society).
70. Kelsen, supra note 53, at 32-33 (emphasis in original).
71. Civilized individuals are more apt to be "obedient to the unenforceable" and
ultimately maintain the power structure. See, e.g., Miller, The Morals and Manners of Advo-
cates, N.Y. ST. BJ., July 1984, at 16, 20 ("How do we compel submission to the dictates
of decency? 'The measure of a civilization is the degree of its obedience to the unen-
forceable.' . . . [N]o amount of police can make us decent, loyal, or fair," (quoting
Whitney North Seymore Sr., and Lord Moulton)).
In short, "[pirofessional courtesy invigorates advocacy. Integrity, collegiality, and
grace.. . are essential to the fabric of professionalism." Brown, supra note 52, at 55.
72. See infra subpart IV(C).
73. See United States v. Meyer, 346 F. Supp. 973, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("If trial law-
yers by their courtroom conduct state their own disrespect for judges in clearly spoken
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breaches, when observed by lay persons, diminishes the dignity of
the proceedings and makes it rather difficult for a judge to com-
mand respect of those persons," one judge remarked in the
survey.
More specifically, judges criticized attorneys and others who ne-
glect to stand at the start of a proceeding or when addressing the
court. 75 Rising is a physical gesture of respect for those proceed-
ings; in some judges' opinions, rising represents respect for the sov-
ereign.76 Indeed, courtroom etiquette requires that even the judge
should stand at his or her place on the bench until the clerk calls
everyone to sit.7 7 In the Survey, judges also commented that proper
courtroom attire constitutes another way to control the profession's
image and to influence the public perception of the proceedings. 78
In a published opinion, one Maryland judge rejected the notion of
lower etiquette standards for lower courts on grounds of public per-
ception: "It is precisely in the inferior courts, such as the parking
court, where the average citizen is most likely to have his first con-
tact with any of the judicial system of the state and to form his or her
lasting opinion of it." 79
So long as serious, dignified, and respectable judicial proceed-
words, no one can expect others to have respect for our judicial system."). Self-re-
straint, respect, and discipline for attorneys are "as necessary to the orderly administra-
tion of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army." Appeal of Levine, 372 Pa.
612, 622, 95 A.2d 222, 226, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 858 (1953) (derogatory remarks made
in presence of court were obstructive and supported charges of contempt). The Code of
Professional Responsibility requires attorneys to represent their clients zealously but at
all times to be candid, respectful and courteous in their relations with the judge. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-36 (1981). See also CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETmICS Canon 1 (1908); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 4-7.1 comment c (2d ed. 1982, Tent. Draft approved 1979) (on respect for
the position of the judge in the administration of the law).
74. Survey response, district court judge, Prince George's County.
75. In my view, the single most violated rule of professional courtesy is that
which dictates that a lawyer stand when addressing the court, and especially
when making objections to evidence. The practice is not merely a proper dis-
play of respect for the court, but acts to focus the court's and the jury's atten-
tion to the issue which the lawyer wishes to raise.
Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore County. See also infra subpart IV(A).
76. "When you sit up there you are the judge .... [Y]ou represent the State of
Maryland. The least a lawyer can do when addressing the State of Maryland, the sover-
eign, is to stand up." Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery
County.
77. Discussion with two circuit court judges, Montgomery County.
78. See infra subpart IV(G).
79. See In re Diener and Broccolino, 268 Md. 659, 692, 304 A.2d 587, 599 (1973)
(report of the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989
(1974).
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ings exist, the public itself will preserve the power and professional-
ism of the courts. The public will support the preservation of the
judiciary if it views judicial pronouncements as legitimate governing
decisions that are a result of solemn deliberation and a well-estab-
lished process, instead of arbitrary judgment calls emanating from a
chaotic, undignified social institution.
This is not to say that judges and others involved in the judicial
process can go too far in preserving their power and professionalism
without reproach. The judiciary must be subject to public scrutiny
and criticism."0 Such criticism is a necessary part of the checks and
balances, and does not undermine the respect and dignity for the
courts-it promotes greater respect. As Justice Hugo L. Black once
wrote:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be
won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly
appraises the character of American public opinion. For it
is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind,
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited,
solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench,
would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and con-
tempt much more than it would enhance respect."'
For reasons of courtroom decorum and stability, however, ac-
tual court proceedings do not provide the best forum for the criti-
cism of judges.8 2 Lawyers must observe standards of courtroom
etiquette in order to engender public respect, authority, and dignity
80. In the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, a nine-member Committee on Civility
was appointed in 1989. The Committee examined judicial as well as lawyer conduct.
The Committee's interim report was published in April of 1991. See Interim Report of the
Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit (1991) [hereinafter Seventh Circuit
Report]. The Report is the first federal circuit-wide survey and report in the nation dis-
cussing the apparent causes of incivility in litigation practice. The Report indicated that
many lawyers in the Seventh Circuit find that "some courts are a source of rude, arro-
gant behavior, establishing a level of incivility that is mimicked in some lawyers' rela-
tions." Id. at 13-14. The Committee's proposed draft of the "Standards for
Professional Conduct within the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit" recommends the fol-
lowing: "A judge's conduct should be characterized at all times by courtesy and pa-
tience toward all participants. As judges, we owe to all participants in a legal proceeding
duties of respect, diligence, punctuality and protection against unjust and improper crit-
icism or attack." Id. at 53. See also id. at 57-58 (proposed duties of the court to lawyers).
The standards suggested in the report closely parallel the existing Canons of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
81. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) (nevertheless, courts have the
power to limit speech in the courtroom to protect against disturbances and disorder).
82. See infra notes 284, 287.
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as representatives of a learned profession. 3
2. Efficiency.-Justice moves faster when the parties are coop-
erative and the surroundings are orderly; accordingly, efficiency is a
second theoretical justification for the codification of courtroom eti-
quette rules.8 4 If we treat others involved in the judicial process
with respect, then the overall administration of justice operates
more productively. 5 Even non-lawyer etiquette experts agree that
when people abide by rules of etiquette, society theoretically func-
tions more smoothly and efficiently.8 6 Etiquette rules remove un-
necessary impediments that hamper the collection of information
and discovery of the truth.8 7
83. McKay, supra note 12, at 76.
My first advice is to stop worrying about the image of the profession-that will
take care of itself when lawyers are seen as the advocates of a just society. I do
not suggest a public-relations gambit, but rather an entirely earnest quest for
the soul of the profession, which must encompass delivery of adequate and
competent legal services.
Id. at 77.
84. Some Maryland judges consider decorum and visual order essential for moving
efficiently through a docket. One retired Montgomery County district court judge, who
handled a daily average of 50 district court cases, said in his Survey response that the
first thing he did in court was to require order so that he could "proceed ... with some
degree of decorum." He required that clothing, books, and newspapers not be placed in
the window wells and that people "not drink sodas or read newspapers, so that a sem-
blance of dignity" could be maintained in the courtroom, and so that "people who have
never been in court before might understand what we are trying to accomplish. Also I
don't want a courtroom over which I preside to ever look like these courtrooms you see
in the movies .. .[where] the courtroom looks a shamble. It's bad enough to try to
accomplish something in a neat courtroom with people paying attention ... but if you
let the courtroom turn into a trashroom, I don't think you accomplish anything at all."
85. See McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 152, 265 A.2d 453, 456 (1970) ("the orderly
administration of courts of justice requires the maintenance of dignity and decorum"
making rules of conduct and behavior essential to the administration of justice).
86. See BALDRIDGE, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE NEW MANNERS FOR THE 90S (1990).
We are a very informal country, and many people feel that the informality has
gone too far in many respects, resulting in inefficency, a lack of respect for senior
authority, and a total misunderstanding of proper deference. I'm with them, so
forgive me if I sound a little starchy about this.
Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
87. See R.W. EMERSON, Manners, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON
(B. Atkinson ed. 1950).
Fine manners show themselves formidable to the uncultivated man. They are a
subtler science of defence to parry and intimidate; but once matched by the
skill of the other party, they drop the point of the sword .... Manners aim to
facilitate life, to get rid of impediments and bring the man pure to energize. They aid our
dealing and conversation as a railway aids travelling, by getting rid of all avoid-
able obstructions of the road and leaving nothing to be conquered but pure
space.
Id. at 385-86 (emphasis added).
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Three areas of efficiency merit discussion: allocation of court
time, reduction of judicial system transaction costs, and maximiza-
tion of the ratio of material information presented to the deci-
sionmakers to immaterial information presented to them.
a. Time.-A finite number of judges possess a finite amount of
time to resolve the disputes assigned to their dockets. Given the
dramatic increase in the number of cases filed in the last twenty
years88 and the increasing length of time that cases take to reach
resolution,89 judges disapprove of behavior that delays proceedings
or wastes their time. Judges prefer efforts to save valuable in-court
time and suggest that etiquette rules can open communication lines
before trial.9" Attorneys who are consistently late to court,9 ' who
88. See J. ADLER, W. FELSTINER, D. HENSLER, & M. PETERSON, THE PACE OF LITIGA-
TION (1982); J. GOERDT, EXAMINING COURT DELAY (1989); W. McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL
COURT CASELOADS (1984).
89. Constitutional and statutory provisions limit the length of time within which a
criminal case must come to trial, but have little effect on the criminal appeal process.
E.g., U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI, cl. 1 (speedy trial); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS (1988); T. CHURCH, JUSTICE
DELAYED (1976).
90. Some judges said that taking time to meet with counsel in chambers prior to trial
speeds up the litigation process. The meeting offers the attorneys a chance to inquire
about the judge's rules and the judge can express her expectations of how the trial
should be conducted. For example, the judge can anticipate issues that might arise re-
quiring a hearing outside the presence of the jury. This allows counsel to place wit-
nesses on standby and also accommodates jurors who may be instructed to report at a
later time.
The United States District Court for Maryland has adopted a local federal rule re-
quiring attorneys to attend a pretrial conference so that parties may enter into stipula-
tions, review exhibits, and anticipate problems or difficult issues that may arise at trial.
See FED. LOCAL CT. RULES (Callaghan) D. Md. Rule 106(6) (1990) (sections relevant to
courtroom etiquette). These local rules are meant primarily to speed the trial process,
and one rule specifically addresses courtroom etiquette. See id. R. 107(9). One judge
uses these pretrial conferences to warn attorneys against unnecessary delays during trial.
Interview, June 5, 1989. These "informal" pre-trial meetings with the presiding judge
promote judicial efficiency and are gaining popularity. See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing
Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (6-5 opinion re-
quiring attendance at pretrial settlement conferences). See also infra note 226 and ac-
companying text.
91. Inefficiency may damage the attorney's case, either by placing her in a bad light
before the judge, or by adversely affecting the jury's view of the attorney. Survey re-
sponse, circuit court judge, Montgomery County.
Jurors dislike having to wait in a closed jury room under an admonition not to
discuss the case among themselves while waiting. They feel left out of the pro-
cess and wonder what is going on that they do not know about and why they are
not included. Too frequently am I called upon to apologize to jurors for the
delay in starting trials because of the late arrival of counsel, and have to invent
excuses for the delay so that the litigants will not be prejudiced by the actions
of their counsel.
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seek continuances, who disrupt the court by carrying on loud con-
versations in the back of the courtroom,92 or who show up for trial
unprepared, commit breaches of etiquette and provoke judges' ire.
Their reactions flow from two sources. First, judges consider
time-wasting conduct a breach of etiquette because of its effect on
others.9" When conduct wastes time, it delays the adjudication of
other cases without significantly progressing the resolution of the
current case; judges regard such inefficient conduct as unfair to cli-
ents and to other attorneys. Second, a judge may perceive time-
wasting conduct as a breach of etiquette because it evidences a lack
of respect for the court system in general or for the presiding judge
in particular. Thus, a judge's concern over a breach of etiquette
may represent an interest in protecting judicial power and efficiency
rather than a concern for the detrimental effect such conduct may
have on others.9 4
b. Transaction Costs .- The judiciary's concern for etiquette
breaches is also related to the transaction costs of court adjudica-
tion. The literature of law and economics discusses the problem of
transaction costs extensively, defining transaction costs generally as
the expenses involved in a purchase or trade other than price.9 5 For
example, in contractual relationships, the cost of enforcing the con-
tract (which may include adjudication) is a transaction cost.9 6 For
the purposes of this Article, the transaction at issue is the resolution
of a case that has been filed in a court; the good being bargained for
is a favorable judicial decision. Reducing transaction costs must be
seen in the context of the "good" being negotiated.
Id.; see also infra section IV(B)(1).
92. See infra notes 223-226 and accompanying text.
93. For example, one Survey respondent commented:
[Uinfortunately the largest... breach of etiquette is wasting the time of others.
Usually this is due to failure to prepare or communicate prior to trial, not only
on the part of attorneys, but clients and witnesses also. The court, and its per-
sonnel, are a public resource which is available to the use of all, and should not
be abused by a few.... While people have a right to their day in court, they do
not have a right to take all day just because they are in court. Consideration for
the time of others, if it exists elsewhere in society, is left at the Court House
door.
Survey response, circuit court judge, Caroline County.
94. See supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
95. See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989); Coase,
The ProbLsm of Social Cost, 3J. L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
96. "Cost of negotiating and completing a transaction.., are examples of transac-
tion costs." R. LIPSEY, D. PURVIS & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 458 (7th ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER].
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As a starting point for analysis, the Coase theorem is useful:
where transaction costs are zero, an efficient outcome will always
result.97 The price of the good under consideration-court adjudi-
cation of a dispute-is probably close to zero. Aside from filing
fees, courts are costless to any party who requests that a dispute be
resolved. Thus, if adjudication of disputes involved no transaction
costs, everyone who believed they had a claim would seek relief in
court. Where the claim was likely to succeed, the other party would
quickly settle. Where the claim was more tenuous, the case would
proceed to trial. But judicial transactions costs are not zero; the
court system has massive costs. Attorney fees, expert witness fees,
discovery costs, and so forth far outweigh the minimal filing costs.
Unfortunately, courts sometimes offer incentives for lawyers to
engage in time-consuming conduct. For instance, if an attorney rep-
resents a defendant being sued for damages, he may well find it ad-
vantageous to extend the litigation even though the defendant has
no chance of winning on the merits. This is because the judicial
interest rate on amounts awarded to claimants in addition to dam-
ages often runs below the commercially available interest rate. 98
The difference between the two rates over a period of years can be
significant.
The existence of transaction costs can preclude efficient out-
comes. Therefore, judges may seek to minimize transaction costs
whenever possible. For example, judges have criticized attorneys
who do not follow the proper steps in introducing evidence, but in-
stead "spring" evidence on the court.9 9 Normally, this wastes court
97. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 95, at 12.
98. For instance, assume the judicial rate of interest is six percent, while the com-
mercially available interest rate is nine percent, a spread of only three percentage points.
If a plaintiff won a $100,000.00 verdict five years after filing suit, the interest on this
would amount to $33,823.00, whereas the commercially available interest rate would
yield $53,862.00, a difference of about $20,000.00. If the case was settled a year after
filing, the "savings" would be only $3,000.00. Moreover, if the defendant appealed and
delayed the case two more years (for a total of seven years from filing to resolution), the
"savings" would be about $32,500.00.
This is a conservative example. If interest begins accruing prior to filing, the differ-
ence is larger; and, if judicial interest is not compounded annually, but calculated as a
nominal rate, the difference also increases. The formula used in the above example for
determining the amount of interest each rate yields is as follows: [((1 + i)" - 1) X V] =
amount of interest; where "n" represents the number of years, "i" represents the inter-
est rate per annum expressed in decimal form, and "V" represents the verdict amount.
99. It is "really only a question of simple courtesy to let the other side see the exhib-
its ahead of time which you intend to offer into evidence; but, the lawyers who do this
are the exception rather than the rule. The rule is that everybody hides their exhibits...
until they're in the middle of the trial and then everything is delayed while we wait for
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time because the attorney must backtrack and follow the formal
rules for introducing evidence, whereas the procedure could have
been accomplished without objection and subsequent time delay.' 00
If the party who sought to introduce the evidence by breaching the
formal rules of court eventually prevails on the verdict, the oppos-
ing side may appeal on the grounds that the jury was improperly
exposed to evidence that eventually was rejected. Although appel-
late reversals of trial verdicts on evidentiary issues are rare, it is pos-
sible that an attorney's failure to introduce evidence properly, cross-
examine a witness, or deliver a closing argument, can result in a
reversal and remand for a new trial. Ajudge intent on lowering the
transaction costs of the court system might well consider an attor-
ney's breach of etiquette to violate the principle of efficiency. Fail-
ure to cooperate with opposing counsel (in the discovery process or
in pre-trial conferences) when such cooperation would expedite the
resolution of the case, would also be a breach. 0 '
At the core of this concern for efficiency are issues both of fair-
ness and of judicial power. If an unprepared attorney engages in
conduct that eventually causes a retrial, the costs to the parties of
adjudicating their dispute could easily double. The escalation of
costs may have a chilling effect on future litigation. 102 A party who
spent years awaiting trial, appealed that result, had a new trial and
then finally succeeded, may not resort to the court system in the
future. When an attorney's mistakes increase costs, they diminish
the victory of the prevailing party and degrade the court experience.
This not only threatens the perceived fairness of the court system,
but also reduces public confidence in the efficiency of the legal sys-
tem.' Indeed, the contempt in which lawyers are held by the pub-
lic may relate to a pervasive belief that lawyers have made the court
system too expensive and time-consuming for ordinary dispute res-
[the] sides to look at each others' exhibits." Survey response, district court judge (re-
tired), Montgomery County.
100. See generally infra subpart IV(E).
101. For example, in a tort case, if the attorneys cooperated in the discovery process
and found that both sides' experts had fairly similar views on the quantum of the plain-
tiff's damages, but disagreed on causation, the parties could stipulate on the damages
issue and limit the trial to the causation issue thus saving time and money. See Lawyers
Object to Colleagues' Rudeness, Wall St.J.,June 24, 1991, at BI, col. 2 ("[R]udeness begets
rudeness, discouraging compromise, derailing potential settlements, prolonging cases
and driving costs up").
102. See, e.g., R. LIPsEY & P. STEINER, supra note 96, at 66-73 (reviewing the orthodox
theory of demand).
103. See generally infra section II(A)(3).
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olution.' ° Consequently, reduced public faith in the court system
threatens judicial authority. 105
c. Information.-An accepted premise of economics is that ra-
tional decisionmaking requires accurate, complete information. 10 6
The judiciary embraces this view by encouraging conduct that in-
creases the amount of material information available while limiting
the amount of immaterial information.
10 7
For instance, if an attorney refuses to stipulate in advance that a
witness qualifies as an expert, the opposing attorney will then be
required to establish the witness's qualifications at trial for the rec-
ord.0 8 A judge may feel that time is being wasted or that the of-
fending attorney is unnecessarily increasing the cost of the case for
all parties.0 9 Several Maryland judges surveyed criticized etiquette
of attorneys who demonstrate no consideration for the court's time
and do not take steps to expedite simple procedures.'0 Alterna-
104. See Sansing, First, Kill All the Lawyers, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Nov. 1990, at 132,
134 (discussing the factors causing the "downturn in the reputation of the legal profes-
sion" and the tearing down of the "curtain of respectability"-for one, "the law ceased
to be a profession; it became big business"). See id. at 136 (discussing partner and asso-
ciate billable hours, charges for associates per hour, and starting salaries for top law
students at major law firms). In an informal telephone survey conducted by The Washing-
tonian, "[a]lmost three-fifths of those surveyed ... thought lawyers were generally over-
paid." About the same percentage of those surveyed who thought lawyers were
overpaid had hired a lawyer in the past and forty-three percent "felt they had gotten
only fair-to-poor value." Id. at 136.
105. See supra section II(A)(1).
106. See, e.g., E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 6 (1958);
D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 5-8 (1986).
107. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402.
108. Rules of etiquette regarding communication between attorneys has also been ad-
dressed in the local rules for the United States District Court in Baltimore. The rule
requires that attorneys meet before trial to set stipulations and view evidence in order to
expedite the trial process and open lines of communication for settlement purposes. See
FED. LOCAL CT. RULES (Callaghan) D. Md. Rule 106(6) (1990); see also Reiter, supra note
28, at 4 ("[e]xcept where any material right of the client is involved, counsel should
stipulate to matters in order to avoid unnecessary hearings").
109. Inefficient use of the courts' time may be attributable to the "[flailure of counsel
to talk to one another prior to trial to determine stipulations and non-objectionable
evidence. Many cases are settled when counsel speak to one another." Survey response,
circuit court judge, Baltimore County.
110. For example, one Baltimore City circuit court judge commented, "I appreciate
the attorney who tries to streamline things. It is irritating to spend time on matters
which could easily have been handled by way of stipulation. When attorneys have gotten
off on the wrong foot with each other [and] as a result don't cooperate, they waste the
court's time as well as their own."
In addition, the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct require attorneys' "rea-
sonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." MARY-
LAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.2 (1991).
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tively, the judge may fear that the jury is being inundated with infor-
mation (such as the responses to the opposing attorney's questions
that will establish the witness's qualifications as an expert) that is
immaterial to the ultimate resolution of the case."'
Likewise, if an attorney is unprepared for trial, his cross-exami-
nation may devolve into an extended discovery session or a "fish-
ing" expedition. A judge may perceive that she and the jury are
burdened by such conduct because, although the information
gleaned is generally immaterial, it requires processing and poses
some risk of distracting a jury from the real issues. 12 A third exam-
ple arises in the area of evidentiary objections. Groundless or
poorly defensible objections not only waste time, but interrupt the
flow of information and distract the jury. Thus, conduct that either
impedes the flow of relevant information or exposes decisionmakers
to immaterial matters is a breach of etiquette and detracts from judi-
cial proceedings.
If decisionmakers are more likely to make correct decisions
when they are exposed to material information and not distracted by
ancillary matters, and if judges consider conduct a breach of court
etiquette on these grounds, then judges who act to discourage dis-
tracting conduct actually encourage correct verdicts. Fairness, once
again, lies at the core of this concern.' ' If juries make incorrect
decisions, parties are disserved and the judicial system is not operat-
ing as it should. Moreover, the judiciary may fear that if the court
system is perceived as operating poorly, public respect for the
courts, and therefore, judicial power itself, is diminished.' 14
3. Fairness.-A third dominant theoretical justification for cod-
ification of etiquette rules is fairness. If formal legal procedures are
entrenched in the legal process then all parties are held to the same
standard of conduct and all parties are equalized procedurally.
"Procedural formality recognizes inequality and attempts to com-
pensate for it by making both parties conform to the same stan-
dards.""' Formalism is thus integral to impartiality.
The fairness theory justifies rules as protectors of two related,
but distinct groups: lawyers and clients. Unfair prejudice to the
111. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
112. Id.
113. See infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
114. See supra section II(A)(1).
115. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice in the Halls, in THE POLITICS OF
INFORMALJUSTICE 159 (R. Hoel ed. 1982).
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lawyer as a professional and to the client as a consumer may result
from breaches of unknown-and perhaps unknowable--customs.
From the client's perspective, etiquette and formalism are the safe-
guards of fairness built into the judicial process. By preventing
chaos in the courtroom, etiquette assists in the discovery of the
truth that lies somewhere between conflicting versions of facts. To
achieve the fairest judgment for a client then, lawyers should be sen-
sitized to the expected norms of behavior in court.
Strictly from a lawyer's perspective, codification of etiquette
rules and increased formalism theoretically ensure that all lawyers
will be treated as professionals and command equal respect as their
peers. The client's interest and the lawyer's interests are interre-
lated because both desire respect and a fair hearing. For example,
some judges chastised lawyers for loud, disruptive talking while
waiting for their cases to be called. 16 They called this type of court-
room conduct "selfish," because those same lawyers later demand
undivided attention when their cases are tried. By implication, trials
will be fairer to the client if such "selfish" conduct is eliminated and
all attorneys have an equal chance to command the court's atten-
tion. When attorneys are aware of the expected conduct rules of a
courtroom, and adhere to them, then they avoid hostilities with the
result that the case is tried with both sides on "equal footing."
a. Historically Male-Dominated Courtrooms.-Who created the un-
written standards of courtroom etiquette? Customs, traditions, col-
legiality, and non-disruptive behavioral norms are the most logical
origins. Customs are inclined to develop into traditions that " 'are
stronger than law and remain unchallenged long after the reason for
them has disappeared.' "117
Men have traditionally dominated the legal profession, particu-
larly in the courtroom. " 8 In the nineteenth century, women were
viewed as physically, emotionally, and intellectually incapable of
competing in the courtroom." 19 In the early twentieth century one
116. See infra section IV(C)(1).
117. Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It Makes, 3 AuSTRAUAN J.L. &
Soc'Y 30, 40 (1986) (quoting Persons Case, [1930] App. Cas. 124, 134 (Sankey, J.)).
118. Women's entry into any profession, especially law and medicine, was until the
twentieth century prohibited by law in many countries. See Menkel-Meadow, Feminization
of the Legal Profession, The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY,
COMPARATIVE THEORIES 199 (R. Abel & P. Lewis eds. 1989).
119. See K. MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 TO
THE PRESENT 173-74 (1986); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 118, at 201 (professions
were deemed unsuitable for women because of biological and psychological differences,
particularly their reproductive and nurturing capacities).
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woman lawyer candidly expressed the opposition she perceived as a
woman trial attorney. She wrote:
[I]t is an ordeal for a woman at the outset of her practice to
encounter in the person of the opposing counsel a courte-
ous, well-bred gentleman whose antagonism is obvious.
She knows'that he is thinking that she has no place in the
courtroom; if she is a good-looking girl she ought to be
married; if she isn't good-looking she ought to be dead or
else justifying her existence by serving in the capacity of
overworked stenographer to some dignified member of the
nobler sex.' 20
Women today continue to be under-represented in American court-
rooms. They have not "disturbed the male-dominated power struc-
ture,"' 2' and they face many forms of resistance to their
participation in trial work' 22 as well as in other areas of the law prac-
tice.' 23 Women lawyers generally sense that they must fight harder
to gain respect,' 24 and even as judges, women are "only grudg-
ingly" accepted in the courtroom.' 25 Male lawyers often show little
tolerance for women making serious decisions that affect them and
their clients. ' 26 Moreover, men within the establishment have tradi-
tionally counted on knowing the judge personally and socializing at
a private club or on the golf course.' 27 It is this historically male-
dominated inner circle of attorneys and judges who are responsible
for creating and sustaining these unwritten rules of courtroom eti-
quette and accepted norms of behavior. According to one commen-
tator on gender and the law, "what it means to be and act like a
lawyer may be misleadingly based on a male norm."'1
28
120. K. MORELLO, supra note 119, at 176 (quoting letter to the New York Sun).
121. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 118, at 205.
122. See K. MORELLO, supra note 119, at 174-75. "The Association of Trial Lawyers of
America reported that in 1978 only 8 states had more than 4 percent of their women
attorneys actively engaged in litigation practices. And although an exclusively female
jury was convened in America as early as 1656, women were not even permitted to serve
as jurors in every state of the union well into this century." Id. Women are seriously
under-represented in the judiciary as well. Id. at 218. When Justice O'Connor joined
the Supreme Court in 1981, only 5.4% of the federal judges were women. Id.
123. See Blodgett, I Don't Think Ladies Should Be Lawyers, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 48.
124. Id. at 49. But see id. at 53 (discussing a southern woman lawyer who states that
being a woman works in her favor when the judge calls her a term of endearment: "It
shows the jury how highly the judge thinks of me.").
125. K. MORELLO, supra note 119, at 218.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Diferent Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Pro-
cess, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 40 (1985).
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b. Formalism Safeguards Equality.-Fortunately, the academic
success of women law students in law schools and the sheer num-
bers of women entering law have "forced cracks in what had been a
men's club."' 2 9 The struggle of women to gain entrance into the
legal profession has been more difficult than that of their counter-
parts in medicine and teaching, and the struggle continues-which
may be a reason "why the formal equality model is so strong among
contemporary feminist lawyers."' 30 In many courts, the "good old
boy" network of male lawyers consists of those privileged attorneys
who are familiar with the unwritten rules of etiquette for a particular
judge. If, however, the rules of behavior are unknown to one side
because these standards are unpublished, unclear, or worse, only
known to the "haves" and unknown to the "have-nots,"'' the latter
group is disadvantaged before the merits of the case are presented.
A woman or minority attorney, as a member of a traditionally disen-
franchised group, may be subject to disparate treatment in court
when she violates unknown, informal conduct codes created and
maintained by the white male-dominated legal establishment. This
disparate treatment violates the right to equality for individual attor-
neys, which is the "right to equal concern and respect in the design
and administration of the political institutions" that govern soci-
ety.t 32 Justice rests on the assumption that all men and women are
subject to equal respect as human beings, not based on their birth
or special characteristics. 13  Etiquette rules advance this right to
equal treatment. 134
The establishment of etiquette standards will raise awareness
among all attorneys, rather than just a privileged few. This analysis
corresponds to feminist "consciousness raising" theory, which
probes into an intrinsically social situation and views the world
through a women's consciousness as a collective social being, not as
separate individuals.i 35 As explained by Catherine MacKinnon,
"[t]his approach stands inside its own determinations in order to
129. Blodgett, supra note 123, at 48.
130. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 118, at 202 (emphasis added).
131. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REV. 95, 123-24 (1974) (discussing American legal traditions and
the notions of uniformity and universality as contrasted with "particularism, compro-
mise, and discretion").
132. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977).
133. See id. at 182.
134. See id. at 227 (discussing the two different rights that exist: the right to equal
treatment and the right to treatment as an equal. The latter is the right to be treated
with the same respect and concern as anyone else).
135. See C. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83 (1989) (con-
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uncover them, just as it criticizes them in order to value them on its
own terms .... 6 Feminist theory, by pursuing accurate analysis
of social life and consciousness, "turns an analysis of inequality into
a critical embrace of its own determinants."'37
Unless the etiquette rules are validated consciously as societal
norms, or better yet, codified, the unknown and unwritten standards
will place unempowered, disenfranchised groups on unequal foot-
ing in the courtroom. 13 8 Therefore, uncovering etiquette standards
and criticizing them based on the legal profession's own determi-
nants is a useful process. In the process of "consciousness raising"
of courtroom etiquette standards, attorneys and judges transform
an ordinary social encounter into a forum where justice is suppos-
edly dispensed fairly to all so that the truth will emerge. Efforts to
"democratize procedures" and reduce formality "can actually result
in an increase in the power of the dominant classes."'13 9 More for-
malism allows all those involved to participate zealously in the ad-
versarial process without hidden deceptions that skew the
adjudicatory process. In other words:
If the social structure is not seriously threatened and the
ruling classes are firmly in control, the procedural fairness
and blind, mechanical application of the rules are the best
defenses of the subordinate classes [or disenfranchised
groups], even if these rules were the instruments by which
the dominant classes came to power. 14 0
Providing a forum where equal treatment is available to all,
therefore, poses a significant justification for codification of eti-
quette procedures. Informal legal practices undermine the benefits
available to under-represented groups and potentially deny them
sciousness raising is the "collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's
social experience, as women live through it").
136. Id. at 84.
137. Id.
138. But see Minow & Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (1990).
Like others concerned with the failures of abstract, universal principles to re-
solve problems, we emphasize 'context' in order to expose how apparently neu-
tral and universal rules in effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share
the characteristics of privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual,
adult men for whom those rules were actually written.
Id. (footnote omitted). The article discusses what is meant by the phrase "in context,"
and the role context plays in terms of the judgment or decisionmaking process, positing
that increased awareness of context could lead to different understandings about human
nature and human interactions.
139. See Lazerson, supra note 115, at 122.
140. Id. at 159.
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equal treatment under the law. 14  In short, the fairness justification
for etiquette rules emerges from the idea that widespread education
and conformity with the expected etiquette standards serve as an
equalizer among attorneys of all races, classes, and genders.
B. A Practical Justification for Courtroom Etiquette
From a practical, rather than a theoretical perspective, etiquette
benefits attorneys because it reinforces their effectiveness as court-
room advocates. While etiquette standards may vary among court-
rooms, the "outcome of a case depends on the presentation as much
as on its merits."' 142 A pragmatic approach to advocacy is for law-
yers to be attuned to judges' particular expectations or predilections
and use that knowledge to their advantage in maneuvering in and
around a courtroom. 143
The advantage of familiarizing oneself with basic courtroom eti-
quette is actually just the opportunity to avoid a disadvantage-to
avoid being offensive and looking unprofessional. For example,
several judges surveyed for this Article noted that some lawyers
have a rude tendency to cut short a witness's answer. 144 Even if the
answer seems harmful to the attorney's case, the practice is viewed
as counter-productive because it suggests that the attorney is trying
to hide information. Other behavior that judges cited as both rude
and damaging is repeating the same questions over and over during
a cross-examination or cross-examining in different ways in the
141. See id. at 119-20. Lazerson discusses the barriers that informalism creates in the
landlord-tenant courts of New York City and asserts that institutionalized legal informal-
ity has eroded the legal status of tenants. See id. at 121. "By institutionalizing the infor-
mal legal practices the courts had followed when the poor were unrepresented, these
new forums adopt procedures that undercut the benefits the poor had obtained from
legal counsel." Id. at 120.
142. Blodgett, supra note 123, at 50.
143. See Egan, Bailey, Collins, Pincham & Suria, What Turns Judges On (and Off) About
Trial Lauryers: Pt. 2, TRIAL DIPLOMACY J., Fall 1981, at 6; see also Klein, A Dozen Ways to
Anger a Judge, LrrGATION, Winter 1987, at 5 ("While some skilled trial lawyers fear jury
backlash from having a judge 'hug them' with approval, they also know that a judge's
hostility will create greater problems.").
144. E.g., "[I1t is becoming increasingly common for lawyers to interrupt witnesses
before they are given fair opportunity to respond to the question put to them. This is
not only rude, but counter-productive, since the judge or jury usually want to evaluate
the answer in its entirety." Survey response, circuit court judge, Caroline County. Eti-
quette may be closely aligned with trial tactics; accordingly, one Maryland judge noted
that he does not consider etiquette to include the areas of efficiency and competence.
Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City. See also Briggs, supra note 28, at
213, 214 (setting out 19 standards for professional discretion, and advising that "[n]o
disciplinary action should be taken when a lawyer chooses to act or acts within the
bounds of his or her professional discretion").
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hope of causing a witness to make a slip of the tongue. Badgering a
witness may also offend the jury and severely prejudice the client's
case.
Several new professionalism codes reflect this practical concern
for effective advocacy. For example, the Arizona Bar's Creed of
Professionalism states: "I will be a vigorous and zealous advocate
on behalf of my client, while recognizing, as an officer of the court,
that excessive zeal may be detrimental to my client's interests as well as to
the proper functioning of our system ofjustice[J" 4 5 Similarly, the
Rules for Uniform Decorum in the state trial courts of Minnesota
include a rule that lawyers must refrain from interrupting one an-
other, assist in making a proper record, and instruct their witnesses
"to testify slowly and clearly so that the court and jury will hear their
testimony."' 146 Both codes reflect this pragmatic, functional ap-
proach to rules of decorum.
In the Maryland circuit courts, where the majority of the State's
jury trials are held, there was widespread agreement among judges
that talking and milling around the courtroom distract jurors during
a jury trial. Moreover, judges noted that conversations whispered
during trial between attorneys and witnesses are impolite and dam-
aging. 147 The ensuing colloquy on the witness stand is usually per-
ceived as rehearsed. To avoid this potentially damaging situation,
attorneys should always ask for "the court's indulgence" before en-
gaging in conversation with witnesses, clients, or co-counsel.1
48
Otherwise, the attorney's poor behavior may detract from the effec-
tive representation that the trial process should provide.
III. ETIQUETrE BREACHES, CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND JUDGES'
DISCRETION TO DECIDE
A breach of etiquette is conduct that does not rise to the level of
contempt of court.'4 9 Only a thin line may separate the two.15 0 As
one judge asserts, "breaches of courtroom etiquette are too sporadic
145. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 10.
146. RULES FOR UNIFORM DECORUM IN THE DISTRICT (TRIAL) COURTS OF MINNESOTA
Rule 21.
147. See infra notes 148, 223-234.
148. Survey response, district court judge, Montgomery County ("talking to the pros-
ecutor about your case when he/she is trying another case" is another common breach
of etiquette).
149. Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City.
150. Schaefer, Attorneys: "Don't Take Thy Opposing Counsel's Name in Vain!", 56 FLA. B.J.,
606, 607 (1982) ("It is not clear when a [lawyer] transgresses the 'thin line' of verbal
misconduct ....").
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to be of any great concern, especially in this jurisdiction where the
preferred punishment for contempt is jail not fines ...., Never-
theless, there should be a line. The bench does not license "ty-
rant[s]."' 52 As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted,
"[w]hile trial judges must be given wide latitude to punish contemp-
tuous conduct, they must ever be on guard against confusing of-
fenses to their sensibilities with obstructions of the administration
ofjustice. '"153
Several considerations help distinguish obstructive from simply
offensive conduct.1 4 Constitutional issues of free speech and due
process may limit judicial discretion in disciplining certain behav-
ior.' 55 For attorney transgressors, absolute immunity may similarly
restrict judicial discretion,' 56 depending on whether the attorney is
gratuitously rude or offends in the course of zealous advocacy. 157
For example, courts have held that continuing to object to a line of
questioning is not contempt.' 58 In Maryland, where attorneys do
151. Survey response, circuit court judge, Worcester County (emphasis added).
152. Line v. State, 62 Md. App. 381, 392, 489 A.2d 553, 558 (1985).
153. Muskus v. State, 14 Md. App. 348, 361-62, 286 A.2d 783, 790 (1972) ("It is no
less important for this Court to use self-restraint in the exercise of its ultimate power to
find that a trial court has gone beyond the area in which it can properly punish for
contempt") (citing Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958)).
154. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 42 Ala. App. 587, 594, 172 So. 2d 796, 803 (1965) (cross-
fire colloquies and wrangling disputes are left to the discretion of the trial judge unless
the expressions used, and not the manner of presentation, are of a prejudicial
character).
155. First amendment protections have also applied to citizens who criticized the judi-
cial system. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Bridges, the president
of a labor union, published a telegram in which he criticized a judge's ruling as "outra-
geous," and suggested that the union would strike if the ruling was enforced. Id. at 276.
He was held in contempt of court, but the Supreme Court reversed on first amendment
grounds. See id. at 278. To suppose that the published criticism had the requisite "sub-
stantial influence upon the course of justice would be to impute to judges a lack of
firmness, wisdom, or honor, which we cannot accept as a major premise." Id. at 273.
See also the companion case of Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 314 U.S. 252
(1941). There, the Court reversed a contempt finding against a newspaper publisher
who opined that certain defendants were "thugs" and "gorillas," called for the judge to
incarcerate them in San Quentin, and concluded that the judge would "make a serious
mistake if he grants probation." Id. at 272 & n.17.
156. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
157. "No disciplinary action should be taken when a lawyer chooses to act or acts
within the bounds of his or her professional discretion." Briggs, supra note 28, at 214;
see Wilkins, supra note 62, at 515. "General limitations on zealous advocacy purporting
to bind all lawyers in all contexts create only the illusion of controlling lawyer discretion
because they ignore the extent to which that discretion is inevitably reintroduced in
interpretation and application." Id. (footnote omitted).
158. See, e.g., Scott v. Hughes, 106 A.D.2d 355, 356, 483 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (1984) (at-
torney's continuing to object was not insolent, defiant of authority, or contemptuous);
People v. Bertelle, 164 Ill. App. 3d 831, 518 N.E.2d 332 (1987) (contempt order over-
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not (yet) have a code of etiquette or professionalism,' 59 courts must
distinguish between those breaches and contempt. "Obviously, the
dignity surrounding the conduct of a trial has certain minimum stan-
dards, but there is considerable play in the wheels of justice, and
beyond those minimum standards an area exists within which the
rigidity of courtroom decorum is left to the discretion of the presid-
ing judge."' 6 °
On the other hand, criticisms of a court's rulings and accusa-
tions of racism against the bench have been held as contempt,' 6 ' as
has insolent or insulting demeanor. 162 Also, repetition may com-
pound the perceived disrespect and turn it ultimately into con-
tempt.' 63 For example, the United States Supreme Court has held
that a pattern of discourteous conduct might warrant an attorney's
suspension, while first offenses might be overlooked.' 64 Assuming
ruled where attorney stated that the court's response to his objection was "unfair");
Commonwealth v. Segal, 401 Mass. 95, 98, 514 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (1987) (not contempt
for attorney to raise objections to introduction of hospital records, nor can contempt be
used to chill vigorous advocacy); see also Curran v. Superior Court of California, 72 Cal.
App. 258, 236 P. 975 (1925) (overruling finding of contempt for attorney's stating "I
take exception to your honor's remarks, and assign them as error"); In re Schwartz, 391
A.2d 278 (D.C. 1978) (attorney not in contempt for persisting in trying to make a proffer
for the record).
159. When a judge has reason to believe that an attorney is guilty of professional
misconduct or is a subversive person, he or she may order the bar association or State's
attorney or both to prosecute. The Maryland State Constitution also sets forth rules for
the discipline ofjudges. See MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4A, 4B (commission on judicial disa-
bilities consisting of four judges, two attorneys, and one layman who investigate com-
plaints against judges and may recommend removal for misconduct; hearings are held
and final decision is by the Court of Appeals); MD. CONST. art. III, § 26 (impeachment
originated by the House of Delegates, and requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate); MD.
CONST. art. IV, § 4 (removal ofjudge by a two-thirds vote of each house of the General
Assembly).
160. Jones v. State, 32 Md. App. 490, 491, 362 A.2d 660, 661 (1976) (quoting Brown
v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958)).
161. See Farmer v. Holton, 146 Ga. App. 102, 245 S.E.2d 457 (1978) (attorney found
in contempt for insisting that opposing counsel refer to a black client as "Mr.," and not
by his first name).
162. See In re Grossman, 24 Cal. App. 3d 624, 101 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1972) (holding
defense attorney in direct contempt for insolent, rude manner and tone of voice); Dodge
v. State, 140 Ind. 284, 39 N.E. 745 (1895) (direct contempt for insulting demeanor).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806, 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 855 (1986) (a single isolated remark is not contempt because it is not a threat to the
administration ofjustice; combined with prior courtroom conduct, however, the remark
justifies a contempt finding).
164. In re RobertJ. Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985). Snyder involved appointed counsel in
a criminal case who submitted a fee claim to the Eighth Circuit and later criticized the
court for the small amount of money it paid for his services. The fee application was
returned for insufficient documentation, and a colloquy between the young lawyer and
the Eighth Circuit ensued. The attorney, Snyder, refused to apologize for a letter he
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that a defendant had descended to "unlawyerlike rudeness," 165 the
Court held that
a single incident of rudeness or lack of professional cour-
tesy-in this context--does not support a finding of con-
temptuous or contumacious conduct or a finding that a
lawyer is "not presently fit to practice in the federal
courts." Nor does it rise to the level of "conduct unbecom-
ing a member of the bar" warranting suspension from
practice. 166
In Maryland, contempt may be either direct or constructive.' 67
Direct contempt is "contempt committed in the presence of the
court, or so near to the court as to interrupt its court proceed-
ings.' 168 Constructive contempt is "contempt which was not com-
mitted in the presence of the court, or so near to the court as to
interrupt its proceedings."' 69 Judges have authority to punish both
types of contempt. 7 ° However, before finding summary contempt,
a judge should warn the offending party and establish a foundation
for a contempt order.' 7 '
Whether or not the judge finds that the behavior was contemp-
tuous, as opposed to offensive, the judge has broad discretion to
implement measures that punish or control. 172 Of course, some op-
had written criticizing the amount of attorneys' fees paid by the federal court and "the
gymnastics" required for attorneys to recover "puny amounts." Id. at 637. To empha-
size his disgust, Snyder instructed the court to remove him from the list of appointed
criminal defense attorneys. The circuit court found that Snyder was "totally disrespect-
ful to the federal courts and to the judicial system." Snyder was suspended from prac-
tice for six months. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. See id. at 647.
165. Id. at 647. " '[U]nlawyer-like rudeness' [is] a virtual oxymoron in today's world."
Brown, supra note 52, at 17.
166. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 647.
167. See Dorsey v. State, 295 Md. 217, 223, 454 A.2d 353, 356 (1983); see also Coyle, A
Question of Contempt, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 30, 1989 at 1, col. I ("civil contempt [forces] an
individual to do something. By contrast, criminal contempt is punishment for past con-
duct." Moreover, "civil contempt requires very little due process, only notice to the
individual and a hearing.").
168. MD. R. P1(a) (1991). See, e.g., Jones v. State, 61 Md. App. 94, 484 A.2d 1050
(1984) (holding that no direct contempt existed because there was no interruption in the
business of the court and no written order was signed); see also Coyle, supra note 167, at 1
(direct contempt "takes place in the judge's presence").
169. MD. R. P1(b) (1991).
170. See MD. R. P3(a) (1991). "A direct contempt may be punished summarily by the
court against which the contempt was committed." Id. "Constructive contempt pro-
ceedings may be instituted by the court of its own motion .... MD. R. P4(a).
171. Robinson v. State, 19 Md. App. 20, 28, 308 A.2d 712, 717 (1973) ("an admoni-
tion should precede judicial resort to the drastic power of summary contempt").
172. Most judges surveyed agreed that jurors, the public, and witnesses must comport
themselves in accord with the atmosphere that a judge sets in the courtroom. Many of
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tions are more applicable to parties to litigation, than to attorneys.
In Illinois v. Allen,' 7 3 the Supreme Court held that when
trial judges [are] confronted with disruptive, contumacious,
[or] stubbornly defiant defendants[,] . . . there are at least
three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to
handle an obstreperous defendant . . . (1) bind and gag
him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for con-
tempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises
to conduct himself properly. 
74
Maryland trial judges have also imposed the constraints estab-
the judges responded that the level of courtroom etiquette is controlled by the judge.
E.g., Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City ("What I have found is that
counsel will respond to each judge's individual requirements. If we demand etiquette, it
is better.").
See Fuld, The Right to Dissent: Protest in the Courtroom, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 591
(1970).
I am asking [my fellow judges] to join with me in a joint effort to devise solu-
tions to the challenge of calculated disruption of courtroom proceedings with
which we have been confronted. Mindful of constitutional obligations, we shall
seek to establish guidelines which will assure a fair trial, courtroom decorum
and the continued viability of judicial process.
Id. at 595. Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal Defendant from His Own Tria" A Compara-
tive View, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 171 (1964).
The civil law and quasi-civil law countries provide by statutory enactment that
an accused may be expelled for misbehavior, while a comparable rule in the
common law countries has been articulated only in a halting fashion in a rela-
tively few cases, with the result that no one can be quite certain that the Anglo-
American courts will decide that they have this power independently of legisla-
tive sanction.
Id. at 185. Comment, Violent Misconduct in the Courtroom-Physical Restraint and Eviction of
the Criminal Defendant, 28 U. Prrr. L. REV. 443, 457 (1967) (discussing the unsettled state
of the law in regard to physical restraint and eviction of criminal defendants and recom-
mending that specific rules be laid down in order to stop the perceived trend of increas-
ing defendant misconduct); Note, Special Project: Judicial Response to the Disruptive
Defendant, 60 GEO. L.J. 487, 503 (1971) ("[A]bove all the court must be prepared before-
hand [for misconduct by a criminal defendant] with a full range of positive solutions.").
173. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
174. Id. at 344-45; see also Flaum & Thompson, The Case of the Disruptive Defendant:
Illinois v. Allen, 61 J. CRIM. LAw 327 (1970); Note, Illinois v. Allen: The Unruly Defend-
ant's Right to a Fair Trial, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 161 (1971) (analyzing the Allen decision
and making suggestions to ensure that defendants receive the fairest possible hearing
while not unduly delaying the trial process); Note, The Power of the Judge to Command Order
in the Courtroom: The Options of Illinois v. Allen, 65 Nw. U. L. REV. 671 (1970).
Although Allen stated that exclusion [from the courtroom] is preferable to bind-
ing and gagging, the better view is to give the defendant who is sincerely, even
though erroneously, asserting what he believes to be his constitutional rights
the option of either being bound and gagged or being excluded from the
courtroom.
Id. at 696.
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lished in Illinois v. Allen. 17 5 The judge, however, must use proper
discretion whenever physically constraining a defendant or remov-
ing a defendant from the courtroom.176 The type of behavior that
would generally be considered a breach of etiquette should never
merit leg shackles or a mouth gag. 177 But even less severe re-
sponses have been overturned as abuses of a judge's discretion.
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed a judge who held a de-
fendant in contempt for refusing to remove headgear worn accord-
ing to religious practices.178 The appellate court acknowledged that
"the orderly administration of courts of justice requires the mainte-
nance of dignity and decorum and for that reason rules of conduct
and behavior to govern participants are essential;"' 79 however, the
wearing of the hat, without any inquiry by the court into its religious
significance, was not disruptive of court decorum and respect.1
8 0
175. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 138-39, 507 A.2d 1072, 1081 (1986) (trial
judge properly exercised his discretion in ordering leg irons to remain on the defendant
at trial; no prejudice was shown).
176. See Jones v. State, 11 Md. App. 686, 276 A.2d 666 (1971). InJones, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals held that the trial judge exceeded his discretion when he or-
dered deputies to shackle and gag the defendant. See id. at 693, 276 A.2d at 670. The
trial judge decided to restrain the defendant after observing, as he walked past his court-
room, the defendant involved in a pre-trial altercation with deputies in the courtroom.
Id. at 688, 276 A.2d at 667-68. The appellate court held that the circumstances in Illinois
v. Allen were far from analogous. See id. at 691, 276 A.2d at 669. The jury's view of the
defendant in shackles denied him due process, especially since the judge had never
warned the defendant to refrain from obstreperous conduct. Id. at 693, 276 A.2d at 670.
177. It should be made clear to all judges and attorneys that the professional courtesy
guidelines currently being drafted in Maryland (in conjunction with the rule 11 profes-
sionalism course) should not be used to hold attorneys and litigants in contempt of
court. Violations of these aspirational standards should merely merit a quiet reminder
to the person who may violate the guidelines or at most an oral reprimand in chambers.
"Violations" of professionalism guidelines are not, and should never be, considered
akin to violations of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.
178. See McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 265 A.2d 453 (1970). The defendant was
wearing a head cover known as a filaas, which he refused to remove because of his reli-
gious practices. Id. at 149, 265 A.2d at 454. "Very well, I find him in contempt and
confine him until such time as he purges himself. That will be when he comes back in
and removes his hat ... ," retorted the trial judge. Id. at 150, 265 A.2d at 455. The
Court of Appeals overruled this contempt order. See id. at 155, 265 A.2d at 458. The
appellate court agreed that in some instances the state may abridge religious practices,
but here there was no compelling state interest, including the court's interest in court
decorum, to outweigh the defendant's religious tenets. See id. at 152, 265 A.2d at 456.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 152, 155, 265 A.2d at 456, 458. In Liner v. State, 62 Md. App. 381, 489
A.2d 553 (1985), the trial judge cited an attorney for three instances of contempt: (1)
asking the court when it intended to rule on his motion and not sitting down instantly
upon command, (2) asking the court to allow the attorney to make a statement for the
record, and (3) requesting to speak to his client. Id. at 385-88, 489 A.2d at 555-56. The
Court of Special Appeals held that there was "no evidence whatever that [the attorney]
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Attorneys should prepare their clients to meet a court's expec-
tations of conduct, but judges bear responsibility for explicating
their own standards. After all, not everyone who comes into a
courtroom is represented by an attorney. "Every judge must re-
member that no matter what the provocation, the judicial response
must be [a] judicious response and that no one more surely sets the
tone and the pattern for courtroom conduct than the presider."''
Judges noted a consistently changing assortment of minor
breaches of etiquette by the visiting public,'8 2 thereby presenting to
judges and court clerks a continuing educational task. Bailiffs or
courtroom clerks initially deal with the public's questions and out-
bursts, 183 but more serious breaches might require the attention of
acted in a contumacious manner, that he did anything to offend the dignity of the
court." See id. at 392, 489 A.2d at 559. The contempt order was therefore overruled.
See id. at 393, 489 A.2d at 559.
See also Cohen v. State, 19 Md. App. 85, 309 A.2d 294 (1973). This case involved a
litigant who was held in direct contempt after filing a written and oral motion asking the
judge to disqualify himself on grounds of prejudice and bias. Id. at 86, 309 A.2d at 295.
The Court of Special Appeals overruled the contempt order noting that the motion was
made in good faith; delivery was proper; and that the language did not "constitute an
'imminent threat to the administration ofjustice.'" Id. at 99, 309 A.2d at 301.
See also Jones v. State, 32 Md. App. 490, 362 A.2d 660 (1976) (reversing the trial
court's order that a spectator who slapped the back of a bench be found in direct con-
tempt of court and be held without bond); cf. Poff v. State, 4 Md. App. 186, 241 A.2d
898 (1968) (although the spectator was not held in contempt, the judge instructed that
signals to the defendant, to alert him that his wife had been arrested, were contrary to
decorum).
181. The Necessity for Civility, supra note 23, at 215; see also supra note 172.
182. Breaches by the public most commonly noted by the Maryland judges in the
Survey were: (1) failure to stand, either when being addressed by the court or when
addressing the court; (2) use of hostile and vulgar language (examples provided by re-
sponding judges were "Why don't you come down off of that bench so I can kick your
ass?" and a wife's obscene harangue of ajudge for jailing her husband on a conviction of
battering her. A few judges complained that the popular vocabulary seems confined to
vernacular idioms, nicknames, and four-letter words that are either offensive or just
plain inscrutable); (3) chewing gum; (4) dressing in shorts, "tank-tops," undershirts, or
sexually explicit T-shirts (one judge anonymously responded to the Survey and wrote
that "[t]he dress of witnesses and parties and even spectators sometimes makes me think
that they are going to a barbecue or some sort of casual entertainment"); (5) continually
traveling in and out of the courtroom during a trial; (6) being combative with court
personnel; and (7) demonstrating a general lack of respect for the judicial system.
183. In the Survey, responding judges generally said that their clerks and bailiffs do
not disrupt proceedings, although some circuit and district court judges remarked about
occasional incidents of clerks and bailiffs speaking out or wandering constantly around
the courtroom.
However, some court personnel have been called unhelpful and prone to respond
"I'm not the right person." See Schauble,Judging the Judges, BALTIMORE, June 1989, at 94
[hereinafter Schauble]. Clerks sometimes have been known to speak abruptly and with
impatience towards attorneys, often for no cause. One district court judge responded
that courtroom clerks and judges' clerks sometimes overreach their authority, make
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the bench: for example, continuing outbursts might provoke a re-
sponse from the judge, which could include an order to have the
transgressor escorted out of the courtroom.8 4  Several of the
judges agreed that the public's breaches of etiquette are attributable
to ignorance of courtroom practice rather than to a conscious disre-
gard of courtroom etiquette.' 8 5 Some judges, however, noted that
they had never experienced problems with the courtroom etiquette
of the public; clearly some are more likely to overlook the public's
conduct and infractions than others.
judgments that should go before the judge, and that a few bailiffs are discourteous and
impatient with both attorneys and the public, especially when the public requests infor-
mation. Survey response, district court judge, Prince George's County. Other judges
noted that some bailiffs overreact to minor rule infractions in the courtroom.
These minor problems are generally resolved after the person is advised of how to
conform to proper courtroom behavior. "I find.., the etiquette of the courtroom clerks
to usually be very fine. One exception to this is that sometimes even the best of them
will fall asleep during the proceedings. I realize that this is sometimes not hard to do,
but it certainly does present a very bad appearance." Survey response, circuit court
judge, Baltimore City; see also Survey response, circuit court judge, Prince George's
County ("As far as the Prince George's Circuit Court is concerned .... the conduct of
the courtroom clerks and personnel ... [is] helpful and courteous both to the Court,
attorneys, and to the public-at-large").
184. See L. CARtRoLL, supra note 63, at 146-47.
"You're a very poor speaker," said the King. Here one of the guinea-pigs
cheered, and was immediately suppressed by the officers of the court. (As that
is a rather hard word, I will just explain to you how it was done. They had a
large canvas bag, which tied up at the mouth with strings: into this they slipped
the guinea-pig, head first, and then sat upon it.) "I'm glad I've seen that
done," thought Alice. "I've so often read in the newspapers, at the end of
trials, 'There was some attempt at applause, which was immediately suppressed
by the officers of the court,' and I have never understood what it meant till
now."
Id.
185. Women with children especially fall into this category. See MARYLAND SPECIAL
JOINT Comm., GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (1989) [hereinafter GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS].
Women litigants face an additional disadvantage in the courtroom: sometimes
their circumstances require them to have children with them. This is particu-
larly true in cases involving domestic violence, child support, juvenile proceed-
ings, and landlord/tenant cases. It occurs when the mother is the primary or
sole caretaker of the child and cannot afford to pay someone to care for the
child during the court appearance, as well as in cases where the child's presence
is required by the court.
Id. at 115. The Committee offered very practical solutions to this problem, such as
scheduling priorities and day care in or near the courthouse, which is the procedure
followed in the District of Columbia. See id. at 115-16. On the other hand, some women
may have their children present in court as a ploy to evoke sympathy, not for lack of
child care services.
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IV. ONE STATE'S APPROACH TO COURTROOM DECORUM:
MARYLAND'S UNWRITTEN CODE OF ETIQUETTE
Whether written or unwritten, every state court has protocols.
These behavioral norms reflect the judiciary's and the bar's concern
for preserving professional demeanor in the practice of law, ensur-
ing fairness in the legal system, and promoting the efficient use of
time and money throughout the litigation process. In preparation
for this Article, all Maryland judges were surveyed in order to un-
cover the etiquette standards that are unwritten (and often unknown
to attorneys).' 8 6 The judges' responses revealed several fundamen-
tal rules of etiquette in the Maryland state courts.
Consistent with the theoretical justifications discussed above,
the Maryland judges' responses, taken as a whole, reflected the need
for adopting etiquette standards to maintain order and to foster the
efficient use of time. An underlying theme that was rarely articu-
lated, but nonetheless reflected throughout the Survey, was that law
is a profession, not a trade, and that lawyers must abide by etiquette
standards to quell the nationally perceived erosion of professional-
ism and respect for lawyers. 18 7
Not all judges surveyed, however, saw a need to educate law-
yers on professionalism standards. For example, some Maryland
judges responded that the etiquette and the decorum of the large
majority of attorneys is intact..88 Several judges even stated that
they had never seen any breaches of etiquette in their court-
186. See supra note 2.
187. "Bar professionalism activities are a 'desperate attempt on the part of lawyers to
deal with the public's perception of them as greedy, unscrupulous and arrogant.'" Con-
sumers Suspicious of "PR Campaign, "BAR LEADER, May-June 1989, at 16. See also supra note
104.
188. I am pleased to inform you that for Baltimore County there is little or no
problem with regard to proper courtroom etiquette and decorum. Most liti-
gants and attorneys who appear before me are courteous and dignified in their
actions and speech. Of course, there are always exceptions to the general rule,
but those exceptions are few and far between.
Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore County. Other Maryland judges re-
ported vast improvements in attorneys' courtroom conduct.
My recollection is that in the 1950's and 1960's it was common practice-
probably a matter of trial tactics or a sort of one-upmanship-for lawyers en-
gaged injury trials to argue and quibble with, snarl at, snap at, and insult their
opponents. At least, that happened before some judges who tolerated those
shenanigans. Some judges, however, insisted on a modicum of decorum in
their courtrooms and made it clear that such behavior would invoke severe
sanctions from the bench. That sort of thing does not happen that much any-
more ....
Survey response, appellate judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
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rooms. 8 9 On the whole, however, the Survey suggested that the
judicial system is slowly moving away from traditional courtroom
formalities. "'
The judges observed that different standards appear to exist at
different levels of the state court system. District court judges fre-
quently complained about lawyers, parties, and witnesses milling
around, laughing, and talking in the courtroom while cases are be-
ing tried.' Most denied that lower court judges should be satisfied
with inferior standards. 192
189. Four circuit court judges responded that, in their experience on the bench, they
have observed no breaches of etiquette. Survey responses, circuit court judges, Balti-
more County (2 judges), Prince George's County, and St. Mary's County. One circuit
court judge responded that "with rare exceptions, the manners and conduct of the peo-
ple who appear before me [are] very acceptable.... Of course, this seems to happen in
small rural courthouses as opposed to the city courthouses where there is confusion and
what appears to be lack of traditional values." Survey response, circuit court judge, St.
Mary's County.
Eight district court judges responded that they had not seen any significant
problems in the area of courtroom etiquette. Survey responses, district court judges,
Baltimore City (4), Baltimore County, Frederick County, and Montgomery County. One
district court respondent did not identify a county.
I can say without equivocation that in seven years ofjudicial service, I have
never had even a hint of a problem with attorneys or courtroom clerks during
the trial of any criminal or traffic case. I suspect that this feeling is shared by
my colleagues here in the eleven District Courts of Baltimore County.
Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore County.
190. One judge commented that older attorneys appearing before him never commit
breaches of etiquette, while "traditions are fading" among the younger attorneys. Sur-
vey response, circuit court judge, Prince George's County.
191. E.g., Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City; Survey response, dis-
trict court judge, Prince George's County.
192. One district court judge asserted that different standards of etiquette should not
apply to the different court levels in Maryland. He maintains that Maryland's unique de
novo system directly affects etiquette of attorneys and the public appearing in the dis-
trict courts in that many attorneys treat the district court proceedings as a "practice
round," not maintaining the same formality of the other Maryland courts. He believes
this approach is wholly inappropriate. Survey response, district court judge, Montgom-
ery County.
Another district court judge commented:
In a court of limited jurisdiction, as is Maryland's District Court, there is all too
often displayed an attitude by attorneys that makes it clear that they regard the
court as something less important than the Federal Courts or the State Courts
of General Jurisdiction. This is manifested in several ways: talking in the court-
room during other trials[;] coming into court late[;] requesting postponements
based on other court commitments, regardless of which trial was the first to be
scheduled[;] coming up to the bench for trial wearing winter outerwear[;]
standing along the sides of the courtroom, instead of being seated, while await-
ing their turns[; and,] being inadequately prepared for trial .... Lawyers should
understand without being told that rules of courtroom decorum do not vary with the amount
claimed or possible sentence to be imposed.
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The following discussion focuses on the existing but unwritten
rules of etiquette as Maryland judges appreciate them. It identifies
basic rules of etiquette and categorizes conduct generally offensive
to the Maryland bench.' 93 The purpose of the discussion is to in-
crease awareness and provoke thought about these unwritten stan-
dards of etiquette. Their usefulness should be evaluated in light of
the theoretical and practical justifications thus far identified.
A. Rise to the Occasion
1. Standing in Court.-For a majority of the Maryland judges
surveyed, the most prevalent breach of etiquette by attorneys was
the failure to stand when addressing the court."' Although judges
assumed this to be one of the most basic rules of etiquette, one
judge suggested otherwise, noting that it was "preferable" if lawyers
knew to stand whenever addressing the court.' 95 Even if it is con-
sidered old-fashioned, judges remarked lawyers have a "woeful in-
ability" to rise to their feet when addressing the court or when
questioning witnesses.' 96 One judge stated that when attorneys
speak while sitting, he acts as if he cannot hear. Only when the at-
torney finally stands does he respond.' 97 This judge's justification
for enforcing decorum is obviously not grounded on the efficiency
justification because of wasted court time; rather, it suggests his
concern with respect and preserving the prestige of the court.
2. Standing Objections.-More specifically, judges said that the
failure to stand when making an objection was the most regularly
Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City (emphasis added).
Indeed, at least some level of courtroom decorum is necessary at all court levels for
maintaining order, efficiency, and respect for the proceedings. See supra subpart II(A).
193. This Article will not attempt to address all breaches of etiquette-for example,
those directed toward the press or courtroom staff-occurring in and around the courts.
194. See also Klein, supra note 143, at 6. "It is amazing how few lawyers stand when
they address the court. Perhaps they think that judges no longer care about these cour-
tesies. They are wrong." Id.
195. Survey response, appellate judge, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
196. Survey response, circuit court judge, Montgomery County. One appellate court
judge, commenting on trial court behavior, observed that attorneys from outside How-
ard County fail to stand when addressing the judge, stating lawyers from other counties
"are unaware of this practice requiring constant reminders." Survey response, appellate
judge, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Some district court judges also placed this
breach of etiquette high on their list. See, e.g., supra note 76.
197. Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County. Other
judges employ this and other techniques to motivate attorneys to stand and to inform
them of the proper conduct expected in their courtrooms. See also Klein, supra note 143,
at 6.
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violated rule.'" 8 The rationale for standing while making an objec-
tion is not only to display respect but, more important, to focus the
court's and the jury's attention on the issue that the lawyer wishes to
raise. 9 9 This judicial concern is based on the practical justifications
for conforming to etiquette. Lawyers who do not rise when making
an objection send a visual and potentially damaging message to the
court and jury about how they view the importance of their client's
case.
20 0
When and how often to object is related to trial tactics rather
than to etiquette,2° ' but even an ill-advised objection can be well-
made. One commentator suggests that the attorney should stand
immediately, then hesitate a moment before stating a legal basis for
the objection.202 If the basis for the objection is obvious, the court
will ordinarily sustain the objection without requiring counsel to
state it, thus promoting efficient use of court time.20 The Federal
Rules of Evidence also reflect this efficiency consideration by requir-
ing counsel to state the legal ground only when it is "not apparent
from the context. '20 4 State evidence rules may also dispense with
the statement of grounds, 20 5 but it is prudent to ask the judge
before trial whether she prefers to have counsel state the grounds
for all objections-at least one judge surveyed requires such
explanations .206
198. See Survey response, circuit court judge, Anne Arundel County. ("I find it dis-
turbing to have [attorneys] make objections without standing up and without giving a
reason. When this happens I ignore the objection. (I warn counsel of this before trial
begins)."
199. Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore County.
200. See id.
201. See McElhaney, When to Object, A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 99 (juries dislike numer-
ous objections and bench conferences because it appears that both judge and counsel
are keeping information from them and do not trust their judgment).
202. See T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 335 (2d ed. 1988).
203. See id. This also serves the goal of judicial efficiency. See supra notes 84-114 and
accompanying text.
204. FED. R. EVID. 103 (a)(l).
205. Similar to the Federal Rules, in Maryland civil and criminal trials, "[t]he grounds
for the objection need not be stated unless the court, at the request of a party or its own
initiative, so directs." MD. R. 4-323(a) (criminal); MD. R. 2-517(a) (civil, circuit court);
MD. R. 3-517(a) (civil, district court).
206. See supra note 198.
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B. Attorneys "Going Walkabout" 2 07
1. Lateness.-The second most common complaint made by
Maryland judges concerned attorney tardiness,20 8 though few
judges at the district court level cited that problem.20 9 In a rare in-
stance, a late attorney was arrested, hand-cuffed, and placed in lock-
up.210 Most of the judges who responded to the survey emphasized
the importance of punctuality for all court proceedings, though
some judges are known to be relatively tolerant of attorney de-
lays.2 1 1 This concern underscores the efficiency justification for
maintaining etiquette rules, because judges noted that lateness
slows down the process and costs everyone time and money.
Lack of punctuality as an etiquette breach also relates to the
207. "Walkabout" is a term of art that refers to a practice of Australian aborigines.
The aborigines, who live primarily in the Outback region of the continent, live in one
location for an indeterminate amount of time and then "go walkabout," which means
that they commence on a journey with no destination or time limit. The individual
sometimes returns to the starting point, and at other times settles down in another
geographic location. It is said that the aborigines are very hard workers, but not
dependable because of their innate calling to "go walkabout." See RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2138 (2d ed. 1987) (unabridged).
208. See, e.g., Survey response, appellate judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
Court is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. and the practice with respect to jury
trials is for the attorneys to meet with the judge sufficiently prior to 9:30 so that
the witnesses and jurors will not be forced to wait while the lawyers and judges
confer. Unfortunately, some lawyers are unaware of this requirement, and we
are required to send a clerk to search them out in the courthouse.
Id.
209. See Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City (recalling "about three
occasions when lawyers appeared late for trial without calling the court or opposing
counsel, and one occasion when counsel misrepresented to me that opposing counsel
had agreed to a postponement").
A few district court judges wrote that they consider promptness and preparedness
to be a litigator's most important attributes. E.g., Survey response, district court judge,
Howard County.
210. See Schauble, supra note 183, at 95. Judge Marvin Steinberg of the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City was reported as having jailed defense attorney Michael Middleton
and public defender Antonio Gioia for not being present in his courtroom when a jury
verdict came back. Id. The case involved handgun and controlled dangerous substance
charges. The jury had reached a verdict after deliberating four hours and the case was
called so the verdict could be read. Michael Middleton's client had gone across the
street to get lunch, and when Mr. Middleton noticed that he had not returned, both he
and Mr. Gioia left the courtroom to look for him. Judge Steinberg had ordered the
marshals to find the two attorneys when they were not present in the courtroom. When
the defense attorneys returned to the courtroom, plainclothes police placed them under
arrest, hand-cuffed them, and placed them in lock-up at the direction of Judge Stein-
berg. They were later walked back to Judge Steinberg's courtroom still hand-cuffed and
chained to Middleton's client who had also been placed in lock-up. d.
211. E.g., Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City.
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concern for professionalism and preserving favorable public percep-
tion of the judicial process. 212 If attorneys themselves are remiss in
meeting court appointments, then the public's respect for the legal
profession and the judiciary will decline. Some judges also consider
frequent walking in and out of the courtroom a breach of courtroom
etiquette.2 t s This breach can disrupt a litigant's presentation of the
issues by distracting the trier of fact and thus implicating the fair-
ness justification for etiquette. Several judges remarked that result-
ing admonitions are also time-consuming, again reflecting judicial
concern for efficiency in enforcing etiquette breaches.
One retired Maryland judge asserted that, in his view, when at-
torneys are out in the hall when a case is called, it is because they
have either neglected to do something earlier, or the client has been
uncooperative. 2 " This Survey response reflects a judicial percep-
tion that trial attorneys have become indifferent to the formality and
professionalism demanded in the trial process and are inefficient in
the use of their time.
2. Overscheduling.-Surveyed judges also complained about the
disruption caused by attorneys who overbook their schedules and
walk in and out of courtrooms to handle several cases. Particularly
in the criminal courts, overscheduling is sometimes an unavoidable
problem for both defense attorneys 21 5 and prosecutors. 2 , 6 Judges
212. See supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
213. E.g., Survey response, district court judge, Montgomery County.
214. Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County.
215. Because of the enormous caseload, public defenders are often scheduled to be in
a number of different courtrooms at the same time.
Most judges on the Circuit Court in Montgomery County are well aware of this
predicament and are generally accommodating and understanding if they are
informed of a scheduling conflict ahead of time. Problems occur, however,
when a lawyer is scheduled to appear in the Circuit and District or Juvenile
Courts at the same time. While there seems to be a sense of cooperation
among the judges on the same bench, that cooperation is not always present
between judges on different benches. On one occasion, I called a Juvenile
Court judge's chambers the day before a sentencing and asked to be placed
first on the 9 a.m. docket so that I could be on time for a 9:30 a.m. commitment
in Circuit Court. The next day, the Juvenile Court judge called my case last at
11:30 a.m. even though his clerk assured me that he was aware of my request.
Interview with Maureen Essex, Assistant Public Defender, Montgomery County, Mary-
land (Mar. 26, 1990). See also infra note 225.
216. One judge observed that in Maryland, as in other state courts, "assistant prose-
cutors, usually housed right in the court facility, too often appear for a court hearing at
their own pleasure, rather than at the time assigned." Survey response, circuit court
judge, Prince George's County. See also Barris, Is Courtesy Really Contagious?, 59 MICH.
B.J., Aug. 1980, at 506 ("I foresee no change in this favored treatment apparently en-
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also criticized private attorneys for lack of punctuality and inade-
quate notice to the court.21 7
The criminal trial lawyer, however, thrives on carrying a sub-
stantial caseload, which inevitably means that the attorney may have
several cases scheduled on the same day in several courtrooms, par-
ticularly misdemeanor cases. Because it is inefficient, if not impossi-
ble, to ask a judge directly for permission to be late, it seems
reasonable for an attorney to speak to the judge's secretary a few
days before the trial is scheduled, or to leave a note in chambers or
with the courtroom clerk and notify opposing counsel of the pend-
ing conflict. Waiting until minutes before the call of the docket to
call the judge's chambers is unacceptable behavior to most judges
and considered a breach of etiquette.21 8
Some circuit court judges simply do not tolerate scheduling
conflicts. One Maryland judge has dispatched sheriffs to escort the
absent lawyer from another judge's courtroom to his own. 1 9
Scheduling conflicts may present a "no-win" situation to some at-
torneys, because even though a majority of the judges expressed
dissatisfaction with attorneys who are not present when the case is
called, some judges criticized attorneys who "mill[] around" the
courtroom while waiting for cases to be called in district court.220
Judges expressed a need to create an atmosphere of respect for the
joyed by assistant prosecutors until judges hold them to the same high standards to
which they should (but do not always) hold defense counsel.")
217. See, e.g., Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City.
There are too many instances when lawyers are due in court for the call of the
docket at 9:30 A.M. and call or have their secretaries call just a few minutes
before that to say they are in another court and will be late. The rules and
protocol require that lawyers do not simply leave a message that they will be
late but in a timely manner seek permission from the judge himself to be late.
This is a serious and bothersome breach.
Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County ("In the District
Court in Montgomery County the proper etiquette is to contact the judge, at least one of
the judges, and have that judge tell you how to proceed."). See also Barris, supra note
216, at 506-07. "[A] telephone call to apprise both the court and opposing counsel of
an unexpected delay is not that burdensome." Id. at 507. Virginia's Principles of Cour-
tesy state: "A lawyer should, on all occasions, and for all appearances, practice punctu-
ality both for the benefit of the court, counsel and client. Where delay, no matter how
slight, is inevitable, prompt communication with the court should be made by the most
expeditious means." VIRGINIA STATE BAR, PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY art.
I(d) (1988).
218. The breach also affects witnesses, one judge wrote, when attorneys fail to notify
them of postponements or to give them an estimated time to testify. See Survey re-
sponse, circuit court judge, Baltimore City.
219. See Survey response, anonymous judge.
220. See Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City.
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authority they wield from the bench; consequently, their criticism
centered upon attorneys who frequently walk around in the court-
room, stand "along the sides of the courtroom, instead of being
seated, while awaiting their turns, '" 221 and talk and laugh "while
cases are being tried."-2 22
C. Silence
1. Talking in the Courtroom.-The mandate of respectful silence
is apparently more commonly breached than it is observed. Both
circuit court and district court judges responded that continuous
and sometimes loud conversations with clients and witnesses occur
while attorneys wait for their cases to be called.223 Onejudge stated
that he observes the most consistent breach of courtroom etiquette
when the court convenes in the morning and attorneys quickly finish
their conversations, turn their back on the court, then take a seat. 2 4
The trial judges' responses that they would like more silence in
their courtrooms evinces their perception of declining respect for
the court (and consequently for their own power), and of the ineffi-
ciency that talking allegedly causes. The former concern is more
defensible than the latter, because allowing whispered conversa-
tions and talking in the back of court may increase efficiency. Judges
want their large dockets to run smoothly and quickly, and whispered
conversations may help the court when plea offers are extended and
accepted.25 In addition, some problems inevitably arise prior to or
221. Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City.
222. Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City. Another judge explained:
[Miany lawyers ... contribute to a constant din ... while [the court] proceed-
ings are taking place. This becomes almost unbearable at times and, of course,
at times it requires the judge to stop everything and ask people to quiet down.
Most lawyers don't realize that it's embarrassing for a judge to have to stop
everything and ask people to quiet down .... This is extremely embarrassing
to me and I know to many other people in my same position because I've spo-
ken to them.
Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County.
223. Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City.
224. Judges mentioned that etiquette is breached when attorneys turn their back on
the judge. Often, while engaged in conversations with a judge, lawyers "will turn their
back right on the judge and start speaking to someone else." Survey response, district
court judge (retired), Montgomery County.
The Virginia Principles of Courtesy provide that: "A lawyer in a courtroom should
... not stand between the witness and opposing counsel during examination... [and
should] avoid turning his back to the person being addressed ...... VIRGINIA STATE
BAR, PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY art. II(n)(iii), (v) (1988).
225. "Those persons representing indigent clients need to be vigilant in their prepa-
ration for court and should be encouraged to asA for a brief recess if they need more time with
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during litigation, and judges should tolerate attempts to resolve
them; allowing these attempts may lead to more expedient trials,
saving the court time and money.226
2. Interrupting and Ignoring the Judge.-Judges complained that
counsel often make side remarks to one another in bench or jury
trials. Some attorneys even argue with one another, 227 and ignore
the judge who ultimately must resolve the issue. 2 Proper eti-
quette, according to these judges, is that all spoken words "go
through the judge," and it is a breach of etiquette for counsel to
address each other directly.229 This procedure serves to maintain
judicial control over every step of the proceedings; to demonstrate
professional composure to the public; and to promote fairness by
allowing both sides an opportunity to be heard.
One Baltimore attorney, appearing in Prince George's County
Circuit Court, was so engaged in an argument that he turned to the
judge and told the judge not to interrupt him. 2 ' 0 The lack of re-
spect not only exhibited breached etiquette, but also subverted the
judge's control over the proceedings. Other attorneys annoy judges
and breach etiquette when they fail to listen. Nevertheless, most
attorneys are deferential to the court, although many of them are
inappropriately garrulous.2 .'
their clients to discuss such matters as plea agreements." Survey response, district court
judge, Calvert County.
The majority of the problems are generated by the enormous caseload as-
signed to the public defenders. They are typically unable to devote adequate
time for trial preparation and are forced to discuss the case with their clients in
the courtroom. In "minor" cases in metropolitan areas, the public defenders
often meet their clients the day of trial. The most disruptive activity is to have
them discuss the case in the courtroom.
Id.
226. Seesupra subsections II(A)(2)(a),(b) (discussing the "efficiency theory" in the con-
texts of time and transaction costs).
227. See, e.g., Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City; Survey response,
district court judge, Prince George's County. When opposing counsel argue, one judge
from the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas leaves the bench and walks into the ante-
room. "Usually it works, and the lawyers are apologetically quiet when I reappear. One
time, though, I stuck my head back in the room after five minutes, to discover the law-
yers still going at it. I do not think that they had even noticed that the bench was
empty." Klein, supra note 143, at 63.
228. Those attorneys who interrupt arguments of opposing counsel fail "to recognize
the function of the judge as referee." Survey response, district court judge, Prince
George's County.
229. Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County.
230. Survey response, circuit court judge, Prince George's County.
231. See, e.g., Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City ("Occasionally, an
attorney will make an unnecessary comment in response to my ruling, requiring me to
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Many judges responded that counsel breach etiquette when
they argue a point after the court has ruled on the issue. 23 2 "Some-
times [attorneys] even want to continue arguing when they win,"23s
one judge reports. A Prince George's County Circuit Court judge
retorts to counsel who continue to press a point that the attorney
will have a chance to argue the issue--"but it will be in Annapo-
lis," 2 4 where the Maryland Court of Appeals is located. Arguing
after the judge has ruled is not only unprofessional, but demon-
strates to the public that the attorney does not take the judge seri-
ously in her capacity as the decisionmaker, which inevitably
undermines respect for the adjudicatory process as a whole. It also
wastes time and effort. In practical terms, there is nothing to be
gained by continuing an argument-but one's professional reputa-
tion may be lost.
D. Forms of Address
1. It's "Your Honor" in the Courtroom.-Titles are simply a sign
of respect for one's position.2 5 Although all attorneys should have
been taught in law school how to address judges inside and outside
of the courtroom, several judges commented that most attorneys do
not know when to say "Your Honor" or "Judge. 2 3' 6 The custom is
to use "Your Honor" when speaking to a judge in the courtroom,
and the less formal "Judge" only outside the courtroom. 23 7
Lawyers who know a judge personally should follow the same
issue an immediate reprimand. In general, I find that civil trial attorneys adhere more
strictly to the rules of etiquette than do criminal trial attorneys.").
232. See, e.g., Survey response, district court judge, Prince George's County; Survey
response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County.
It is disturbing and constitutes a breach of good etiquette when a lawyer inter-
rupts the judge who is giving his or her ruling. A judge may interrupt an attor-
ney in the closing argument in an attempt to help the judge with his or her
thinking. However, there is no good reason that I can perceive as to why a
lawyer should interrupt a judge when a judge is giving his or her opinion which
will finally conclude the case.
Id.
233. Survey response, circuit court judge, Worcester County (emphasis added).
234. Survey response, circuit court judge, Prince George's County.
235. Even Supreme Court justices have preferences. See, e.g., NJ.L.J., Feb. 12, 1981,
at 7, col. 4. ("Word from Washington is that the nine members of the Supreme Court
have stopped calling themselves 'Mr. Justice' and may henceforth be properly addressed
as 'Justice.' ").
236. E.g., Survey response, circuit court judge, Montgomery County.
237. See id. "In my view, the use of the word 'Judge' is for informal occasions and not
in the courtroom, while 'Your Honor' should be used in the courtroom." Id. See also J.
MARTN, supra note 1, at 57:
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rules, unless the circumstances are inappropriate or the judge indi-
cates otherwise. An assistant public defender in Maryland pointed
out that it is inappropriate to call a friend who was made a judge by
her first name outside of court in the presence of a client because it
would demean the judge's position of authority and be disrespectful
in the presence of others.238 Several Maryland judges noted that it
is a breach of decorum for lawyers appearing before one judge to
refer to another judge by his or her last name only, without using
the title "Judge."'"29
Other judges commented that attorneys no longer introduce
their arguments with "May it please the court .... "240 This is prob-
ably unnecessary in most trial courts, but it remains the more tradi-
tional, formal beginning, particularly in the appellate courts. The
rules concerning the use of titles are grounded solely in the preser-
vation of power and professionalism justification for etiquette rules.
Judges have warned that lawyers should be careful, however, to
avoid the other extreme-fawning over a judge.2 4 '
2. No First Names.-To further the goals of professionalism
and fairness to the opposing side, attorneys should not address
adult witnesses by their first names. Attorneys who do so, usually to
make the witness feel at ease on the stand, use a tactic that is consid-
DEAR MISS MANNERS:
Do I introduce my son as "Judge Harry" (not his real name) or just "Meet
my son, Harry"?
GENTLE READER:
Just Harry. Miss Manners knows this answer will disappoint you, but
promises you that it will be all the more satisfying to have people then inquire,
as they always do nowadays, what Harry "does."
Id. Cf Sullivan, Practice Direction, NEW ZEALAND L.J., Apr. 1980, at 147 (legal etiquette in
the district courts of New Zealand requires that the judge be addressed as "Your
Honor");Judicial Forms of Address, NEW ZEALAND L.J., May 1984, at 150-51 (chart explains
the proper forms of address within the entire New Zealand judicial system).
238. A woman I knew as an opposing counsel and friend was made judge.
Although I usually address her by her first name when I run into her outside of
the courtroom, I would not do so in the presence of a client for the same reason
I would not address her by her given name in court. Respect for her position
must be observed in the presence of criminal defendants and other individuals
appearing before her so that there is no misunderstanding that the position she
holds is one of authority and that her orders must be obeyed.
Interview with Maureen Essex, Assistant Public Defender, Montgomery County, Mary-
land (Mar. 26, 1990).
239. Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County.
240. See, e.g., Survey response, circuit court judge, Prince George's County.
241. See Klein, supra note 143, at 6.
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ered disrespectful.2 42 The use of first names or nicknames is unpro-
fessional conduct and can potentially anger a judge, which in
practical terms could harm a client's position before the court. 43
Likewise, attorneys should not refer to one another by first names
during a trial.244
Failure to introduce co-counsel or request permission for co-
counsel to sit at the trial table is another breach of etiquette that
several judges noted. 245 Although this formality may add time to
the trial process, the exertion is de minimis. Moreover, this small
burden is overcome by the Maryland judges' valid concern for com-
manding equal respect for each participant in the adversarial
process.
3. Derogatory Remarks about Opposing Counsel.-Derogatory re-
marks and other personal attacks2 46 on opposing counsel offended
many judges, who considered it a breach of the most basic standards
of professionalism.247 One judge said he does not tolerate even
242. See Survey response, district court judge, Prince George's County; see also Survey
response, district court judge, Baltimore City (attorneys addressing witnesses and par-
ties by their first names occurs "with some regularity").
243. See, e.g., Survey response, circuit court judge, Caroline County.
I find offensive the use of first names or nicknames by people in court, espe-
cially if the use is unauthorized. Often this is done for subtle reasons to manip-
ulate or irritate the person whose name is being abused. Since the persons
(usually witnesses) whose names are being abused are there involuntarily, at
the behest of the court, the court should protect the sanctity of their name.
Id.
244. On official documents, however, an attorney may sign with less than his or her
full name. "A signature which uses the diminutive form of a person's given name (as
compared to an assumed or incorrect name) is not, in and of itself, a false or misleading
communication by or about the lawyer." Committee on Ethics, A Question of Diminutive
Form, MD. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 40. An attorney's letterhead should, however, recite
the same name that appears in the Maryland bar registration. See id.
245. Whenever a third person, such as a paralegal or an expert witness, wishes to sit at
the trial table, counsel should always ask permission from the presiding judge, and then
formally introduce that person to the judge and jury. See Survey response, circuit court
judge, Baltimore City.
246. See L. CARROLL, supra note 63, at 83. " 'You should learn not to make personal
remarks,' Alice said [to the Mad Hatter] with some severity; 'it's very rude.'" Id. See also
J. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 73.
247. A Maryland appellate judge responded to the Survey quoting the following pas-
sage, which is taken from a transcript of a hearing on discovery motions:
[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL]: Initially the plaintiff filed a request for the produc-
tion of photographs that were taken by [the corporate defendant]. The defend-
ant's response to that was [that] these photographs were work product, which
response was absolutely incorrect and contrary to the law of the State of Mary-
land, and the plaintiff filed an appropriate response to that.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel the production of not
only those photographs, but some sketches that were taken at the scene. The
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harmless, irrelevant personal comments.24 Observed by lay per-
sons, such conduct "diminishes the dignity of the proceedings and
makes it rather difficult for a judge to command respect of those
persons. '"249 Insults make the attorney who resorts to that tactic
look foolish, unprofessional, and unable to engage in sophisticated
legal analysis. Oddly, these remarks between attorneys can be privi-
leged communications.25 0
A more egregious breach, some judges said, is to interrupt op-
posing counsel in the midst of an argument. Such behavior distracts
the decisionmaker's collection of information, interrupts the flow of
the proceedings, and causes inefficiency in court proceedings. Pro-
fessional interaction between attorneys rather than personal effron-
tery is courtroom conduct to be re-learned by practitioners and
nurtured in new members of the bar, according to Maryland trial
judges. 51
defendant filed an opposition again misstating what the law is in the State of
Maryland.
[DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY]: I'm going to object right off the bat. He calls
me a liar in pleadings. He puts all of those innuendos in. This little pimple has
the audacity to act like a man and he isn't half a man.
THE COURT: Mr. [DEFENSE COUNSEL], let him finish. Go ahead, will you
please.
The appellate judge deciding this case said: "I don't know what is worse: the atrocious
conduct of counsel or the judge's reaction to it." Survey response, appellate judge,
Maryland Court of Special Appeals. See generally Schaefer, supra note 150, at 606-11 (dis-
cussing whether an attorney can be disciplined for criticizing another attorney in and
outside the courtroom-and the first amendment implications of such speech).
248. See Survey response, district court judge, Prince George's County. But to many
trial judges who have heard an abundance of unnecessary commentary, a mere poor
choice of words by an attorney regarding another attorney does not amount to a breach
of etiquette.
249. Survey response, district court judge, Prince George's County.
250. One court has held that "[a] lawyer's remarks about another are absolutely privi-
leged.., where they are spoken in the course of a judicial or administrative proceeding
and relate to the matters at issue in the proceeding." Arneja v. Gildar, 541 A.2d 621,
622-23 (D.C. 1988) (attorney commented to opposing attorney, who was a Sikh born in
India: "You're unnecessarily pursuing this case. You don't understand the law.... You
better learn your English, go to elementary school.")
A New Jersey Court has held that a lawyer's letter to a third party not directly in-
volved in pending litigation, but certainly interested in the lawsuit, was cloaked with
absolute immunity. The letter (containing allegedly libelous assertions) satisfied the
two-prong test for absolute immunity: it was made in the course of ajudicial proceeding
and it bore some relation to that proceeding. See DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J. Super. 453,
550 A.2d 163 (1988).
251. "I believe that it is almost a rule that attorneys in contested cases take on the
cause of their clients and rather than be an advocate, are adversaries, particularly to one
another. The courtesies between lawyers [are] extremely lacking and discouraging to the
court." Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore County. The same judge also
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E. Presentation of Evidence
Etiquette plays a role in guiding attorneys' maneuvering around
a courtroom, especially in the presentation of evidence to witnesses,
the clerk of the court, the judge, and the jury. Several judges re-
sponding to the Survey observed a lack of formality in handling evi-
dence and attorneys turning their back on the judge when
maneuvering with evidence.252 It is the obvious (and embarrassing)
fault of law schools for this failure of basic legal training.253 These
formal rules are aimed at achieving courtroom efficiency. By the
time every law student graduates, he or she should know the basic
steps for introducing evidence in a court of law, just as doctors know
rudimentary anatomy. Lawyers unfamiliar with a court or particular
judge should follow the basic steps unless instructed otherwise by
the presiding judge.254
Several district court judges were disturbed by lawyers' com-
mon failure to show the exhibit to opposing counsel. This concern
reflects the fairness considerations justifying adherence to formal et-
iquette rules. Other breaches noted by judges included failure to
ask permission to approach a witness and failure to ask permission
noted that overall, attorneys, clerks, and others are very courteous and show great re-
spect for the court.
Attorneys should not lose sight of their role as advocates and should not become
combatants. The American Bar Association provides that: "[t]he basic duty the lawyer
for the accused owes to the administration of justice is to serve as the accused's coun-
selor and advocate with courage, devotion, and to the utmost of his learning and ability
and according to law." 2 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-5.1 (2d ed., 1982, Tent. Draft approved 1979).
252. See, e.g., Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County.
Many lawyers will merely hand the exhibit right to the judge. All exhibits
should be handed to the clerk to maneuver between the lawyer and the judge.
Defense attorneys and State's attorneys fail to pay any attention to the way an
exhibit or file is handed up to the judge. I think some State's Attorneys (on
purpose) hand the file up so that it's upside down; others love to hand it up so
it's sideways. It would be... very courteous to hand a file up so that it's in the
proper position for the judge to either read it or write on it as soon as he takes
it ....
Id.
253. The steps for properly introducing and using evidence are: (1) have the exhibit
marked; (2) show the exhibit to opposing counsel; (3) ask the court's permission to ap-
proach the witness (contrary to popular impressions created by television courtroom
scenes); (4) show the exhibit to the witness; (5) lay the foundation for the exhibit; (6)
move for admission of the exhibit into evidence; (7) have the exhibit marked in evi-
dence; (8) have the witness use or mark the exhibit; (9) obtain permission to show or
read the exhibit to the jury; (10) publish the exhibit to thejury. See T. MAUET, supra note
202, at 156-60.
254. Local attorneys, the court clerk, and intelligent observation may provide the
same information.
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to approach the bench.255 These rules are perhaps inefficient be-
cause they can be time-consuming. Nonetheless, the formalities of
approaching a witness or the bench are justified because they main-
tain the judge's authority and control over the lawyers. Such con-
duct may in fact be overly deferential; it is directed specifically at the
institutional roles played by judges and witnesses, rather than their
roles as individuals. Even if time-consuming, this conduct ulti-
mately preserves the power of the system by requiring outward
demonstrations of respect.
On the other hand, the opportunity to maneuver around the
courtroom and interact with the witness or judge gives the advocate
a chance to control the courtroom and command respect, sympathy,
or admiration.256 Skilled litigators communicate with the jury or
witness through body language, facial expressions, gestures, and
other subtle means of communication.257 Thus, the factfinder's per-
ceptions of the individual attorney's character may be a guide to the
truth that the judge or jury is seeking.25 8 For even in a courtroom,
"[a] man's manners are a mirror in which he shows his portrait. "259
A lawyer's unspoken performances often translate into subtle per-
suasion and a win for his or her client.
F. Composure: The Sign of a Professional
Loudness and gesticulation may constitute breaches of eti-
quette. 260 "Lawyers whose intonations drip with sarcasm while say-
ing, 'Thank you, Your Honor,' after a ruling against them also do
255. Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City.
256. Skillful litigators command respect and project credibility in the courtroom
arena through displays of their personal style and by conveying to the jury or judge
messages of disbelief, indignation, sympathy, righteousness or humor. See E. GOFFMAN,
STRATEGIC INTERACTION 102-13 (1969) (discussing a framework for interpersonal deal-
ings and decisionmaking from a game theory perspective).
257. See id. "In every social situation we can find a sense in which one participant will
be an observer with something to gain from assessing expressions, and another will be a
subject with something to gain from manipulating this process." Id. at 81.
258. See R.W. EMERSON, Character, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMER-
SON 368-69 (B. Atkinson ed. 1950).
The reason why we feel one man's presence and do not feel another's is as
simple as gravity. Truth is the summit of being; justice is the application of it to
affairs .... Character is this moral order seen through the medium of an indi-
vidual nature. An individual is an encloser. Time and space, liberty and neces-
sity, truth and thought are left at large no longer.
Id.
259. J.W. VON GOETHE, PROVERBS IN PROSE (undated), quoted inJ. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 397 (15th ed. 1980).
260. People, in general, tend to speak very loudly when trying to communicate with
someone who does not speak their own language; similarly, one judge emphasized that
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not go unnoticed by judges or jurors.- 26 1 When attorneys grimace
or use other body language to show displeasure at a judge's ruling,
they breach the norms of courtroom decorum.262 But few judges
said that this behavior occurs regularly before them. Some maintain
that discomposure walks the fine line between bad style and a
breach of courtroom etiquette.265 Other judges responded that
they have observed what they called breaches of courtroom eti-
quette when counsel have thrown papers or pencils on the trial table
in fits of disgust or anger.2 In addition, several judges mentioned
that attorneys breach etiquette when they leave the courtroom, per-
haps as a show of disgust or frustration, before the judge has fully
concluded the case. 265 Finally, in the face of verbal attack, it is obvi-
ously best for counsel and the client to maintain a straight face and a
calm demeanor.
G. Bare Essentials in Dress
DEAR MISS MANNERS:
I find myself quite caught up in litigation these days.
What does a lady wear to her first felony trial? This clearly
is a significant occasion. I do so want to do the Right
Thing; even more, I want the jury to do the Right Thing.
Surely, appropriate attire is integral to a speedy acquittal.
the lawyer who speaks the loudest does not necessarily prevail. Survey response, circuit
court judge, Anne Arundel County.
261. Klein, supra note 143, at 62.
262. See Survey response, district court judge, Prince George's County (use of tone of
voice or gestures communicating disgust or appall at judge's ruling breaches courtroom
etiquette). The New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld a $500 fine and rebuke that a
trial judge imposed on a lawyer who twice laughed or made mocking displays at two of
the judge's rulings; however, it did not uphold a two-day jail sentence the judge also
imposed. See In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 58, 570 A.2d 416, 420 (1990). The court ex-
pressed a desire that more formal procedures be used in this type of contempt case,
including affording the accused party the right to counsel and referring the matter for a
hearing before a different judge. See id. at 72-73, 570 A.2d at 427.
263. Related to this lack of composure is the attorney who has personal idiosyncracies
of which he is normally not aware. For example, some attorneys place their hands in
their pockets and jiggle their change as a nervous habit while speaking in court. Other
lawyers, one judge said, "clean out their ears with one side of [their] eyeglasses and their
nose with the other side." Survey response, district court judge (retired), Montgomery
County.
264. One judge who responded to the Survey said that attorneys breach etiquette
when they "show annoyance, slamming down a pen or pencil on the counsel table,
showing disgust." Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore County.
265. It is proper etiquette for attorneys to wait until the court has concluded all mat-
ters regarding the case, even including marking the file, to ask the court's permission to
be excused. See, e.g., Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City; Survey re-
sponse, district court judge (retired), Montgomery County.
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GENTLE READER:
Naturally, what one wears to trial should have no bear-
ing on the jury's finding. Naturally, what one wears to a
trial has an influence on the jury. This is because in the
complex process of determining what is just, juries take
into consideration the view that the defendant has towards
society and its laws .... 266
Miss Manners' advice highlights dressing appropriately for
court, though it may seem a de minimis concern in the larger
scheme of the trial process. Of course, it is not. Lawyers know this;
but, judging from the Survey responses, many of their clients do not
appreciate that clothing sends immediate signals to the judge and
jury. Sometimes, a party's attire offends a judge's courtroom stan-
dards. Even if the clothing does not sink to that level, the attorney
who fails to teach clients what to wear risks perhaps even worse con-
sequences. The decisionmaking process for some, if not all, jurors
begins at the initial visual encounter with a party to the litigation.
Miss Manners, with a heightened understanding of common-sense
reality, articulates some of the important concerns that attire may
signal to the fact-finder: "Is she, for example, someone who has
been driven by conscience to violate a law or someone who rou-
tinely defies society, in big matters and small, out of lack of respect,
a feeling of superiority, or simply for amusement?" '267 Especially
when a defendant exercises his or her rights to remain silent at trial,
appearance is very important. 268 And yet, while common sense may
dictate what is appropriate wear for the courtroom, sometimes com-
mon sense stops at the door, observed many judges in their Survey
responses. Clothing that distracts or offends is, to some judges, a
breach of etiquette because it undermines the serious, professional
atmosphere of the proceedings. 269
266. J. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 138. Miss Manners then reassured her correspondent:
By your small politeness in the course of your action, you demonstrated that
you subscribe to the idea that one follows the conventional gestures of one's
society in order to reassure others that one means them no harm. Dressing in
conformity with the most conservative standards of the community should not
win you a speedy acquittal, but it should signal the jury that you respect soci-
ety's standards.
Id.
267. Id.
268. Based on the author's experience as a clinical supervisor at the Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center's Criminal Justice Clinic and in conjunction with two Maryland Pub-
lic Defender's offices, it is not uncommon for public defenders to find themselves in a
clothing store on the eve of trial so that they can provide an incarcerated client with
something to wear besides prison garb.
269. Many judges commented that casual clothing such as sweat-suits, shorts or jeans
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Judges agreed that shoes, a shirt with sleeves, and long pants
for men, and skirts or dresses for women are the bare essentials.
Attorneys, clients, and witnesses should not wear hats27° or head-
gear in court, unless for religious purposes. 27 1 When a person is
not dressed correctly, what recourse does the court have? Some
judges have sent witnesses back home to change.272 On the other
hand, judges cannot enforce a dress code for the public because
they risk compromising the personal tastes of the wearers or even an
infringement on first amendment rights.273 As one might expect,
the judges indicated that they hold lawyers to a higher standard for
proper attire than witnesses, jurors, and spectators. 274
Sending a witness or attorney home to change clothing clearly
is inefficient and a waste of the court's time. The only justification
for this is to preserve the dignity of, and respect for, the proceed-
ings. Formal attire is a sign of respect and a visual acknowledgment
of the seriousness of an event. Examples are dressing in black while
in mourning 275 or wearing formal attire to attend a musical or artis-
tic event.
27 6
have become commonplace at the district court level. See, e.g., Survey response, circuit
court judge, Baltimore City; Survey response, circuit court judge, Caroline County; Sur-
vey response, district court judge, Prince George's County.
270. For example, one circuit court judge said he was quite irritated by attorneys who
enter, while court is in session, still wearing an outer coat or a hat. See Survey response,
circuit court judge, Montgomery County.
271. See McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 153, 265 A.2d 453, 456 (1970) (error to
adjudge defendant in direct contempt for his refusal to remove his headgear in court
without first affording him an opportunity to justify his conduct or religious grounds).
272. One retired district court judge replied that in terms of breaches of etiquette by
the public, there is little to be done regarding dress since they have no formal training
on courtroom behavior and dress. On occasion, the judge would ask an inappropriately
dressed person appearing in his courtroom to return home to change, especially in the
summer when people tend to wear shorts. See Survey response, district court judge (re-
tired), Montgomery County.
273. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (upholding as protected first
amendment speech a person's right to wear a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"
in a Los Angeles courthouse corridor).
274. See, e.g., Survey response, appellate judge, Court of Appeals of Maryland ("I pre-
fer to see lawyers argue cases while wearing suits as opposed to sports jackets and slacks
.... "); Lind, Boles, Hinkle & Gizzi, A Woman Can Dress to Win in Court, 70 A.B.A. J. 92
(1984) (discussing how clothing influences a jury's evaluation of a female attorney's
trustworthiness, professionalism, and credibility). The authors also contend that a wo-
man who is "perceived as trying to look like a man loses rather than gains authority." Id.
at 92.
275. But see M. MrrCHELL, GONE wrrIh THE WIND 133 (1936). Proper antebellum eti-
quette required that widows wear black and refrain from dancing. That is, of course,
until Rhett Butler offered one-hundred and fifty dollars in gold to dance with Mrs.
Charles Hamilton, who was in mourning for the loss of her beloved husband. See id.
276. Proper dress is an integral part of participating in a special event. Recall in The
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H. Client Misconduct
The onus of teaching clients how to behave falls, as does the
matter of attire, on attorneys. Litigants commit breaches of eti-
quette because often they are unfamiliar with the courtroom and
judges' expectations. Indeed, Maryland judges commented that pro
se litigants regularly breach the most basic rules of etiquette. 2 " Un-
represented parties often interrupt the judge, witnesses, and oppos-
ing counsel without waiting for the court's recognition. 278 Judges
Women of Brewster Place the sense of self-respect that overcame Cora Lee's family as she
dressed them properly for the special occasion of attending a Shakespeare play in the
park:
-there was something in the air. It felt like Christmas or a visit from their
grandparents, but neither of these was happening ....
Cora sorted feverishly through their clothes-washing, pressing, and
mending.... She patched and fussed, meshed and mated outfits until she was
finally satisfied with the neatly buttoned bodies she assembled before her. She
lined up the scoured faces, carefully parted hair, and oiled arms and legs on the
couch, and forbid them to move.
G. NAYLOR, THE WOMEN OF BREWSTER PLACE 122 (1982).
277. One District court judge wrote that although there is little or no problem with
attorneys who appear before him,
pro se litigants account for another disproportionate share of breaches of eti-
quette. These litigants are more likely to be unruly and obstreperous in court.
They will often blurt out that the law is not fair or that my verdict is unfair to
them. They also have a tendency to argue angrily with police officers. Basi-
cally, these people fall into two categories. The first category is comprised of
people who are intimidated by the prospect of appearing in court by them-
selves. They compensate by acting cocky or over-confident and tend to be
more rude in the courtroom than they would in other social settings. Teenag-
ers and housewives often fit into this category.
The second group of ill-mannered pro se litigants are those who appear to
have borderline characterological disorders. The fact that they are appearing
in court without an attorney is in and of itself instructive. These people come
into court looking for an argument and generally create a situation in which
they will find what they are looking for. These people will often make bizarre
accusations of rude, discourteous conduct on the part of the police officers,
when it would appear that they were rude and discourteous to the police officer
in the first instance. These are the people who usually exit the courtroom mak-
ing vatic utterances to the effect that, "I knew I wouldn't get a fair trial," and "I
am going to appeal!" My experience tells me that it is in the best interest of all
to simply allow a person like that to leave the courtroom without challenging
his or her conduct and risking escalation of the matter.
Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore County. See also Laub, The Problem of the
Unrepresented, Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 Duo. L. REV. 245
(1964) (sympathizing with the trial judge's plight and recommending better understand-
ing on the part of appellate judges who review cases involvingpro se litigants); Comment,
Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 551 (1969) (suggesting that the problems of pro se
representation might be lessened through the employment of advisory counsel); Note,
Right to Defend Pro Se, 48 N.C. L. REV. 678, 684-85 (1970) (noting a "potential interfer-
ence with orderly trial practice").
278. See Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore County ("[I]n many instances
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noted the lack of pre-trial preparation of clients by their attorneys
regarding courtroom etiquette. The example was given of litigants
blurting out comments or arguing with opposing counsel.279 One
judge maintains that litigants probably "get their ideas of what court
is about from [the television shows] 'People's Court' or 'Divorce
Court.' ",280 An attorney's role may include instructing clients to
stand, to sit up straight, or to remove hands from pockets.
Attorneys should alert their clients to the fact that jurors and
judges are always watching and are keenly aware of body language
or other subtle gestures and facial expressions. When a client mis-
behaves in court, the attorney should make every reasonable and, if
possible, subtle effort at control. The American College of Trial
Lawyers stated that the lawyer's professional obligation includes the
duty "to advise any client appearing in a courtroom of the kind of
behavior expected and required of him there, and to prevent him, so
far as lies within the lawyer's power, from creating disorder or dis-
ruption in the courtroom." 28 ' But it is improper for the attorney to
make loud or hostile demands on the client to act properly. A law-
yer must at all times remain a zealous advocate-which in some
courtrooms precludes reprimanding even a disruptive client to pre-
serve the overall fairness of the adjudication.28 2
I. Breaches of Etiquette by Judges
DEAR MISS MANNERS:
What is the proper salutation for a former .. .judge
who has been convicted of accepting bribes and is now
serving his country in a federal penitentiary? I know that
formal public officials are normally addressed as "The
[the attorneys] will not have their clients as presentable as they should, particularly in
criminal cases attorneys allow the defendants to slouch, put their hands in their pockets
and have a very disaffected demeanor.").
279. See Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City ("Too frequently, a liti-
gant will simply blurt something out or begin arguing with the other lawyer or party.");
see also Survey response, district court judge, Baltimore City; Survey response, district
court judge, Prince George's County.
280. Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City.
281. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON Dis-
RUPTION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 6 (1970) (Principle IIl(d), lawyer's obligations).
282. See Survey response, district court judge, Prince George's County.
While I have found the decorum of the bar toward the bench exemplary, I have
found the conduct of a number of attorneys toward their clients reprehensible.
I have seen some attorneys yell at their clients to "shut up" at counsel table
during trial. Although some criminal defendants may well be very annoying, I
see no need for their attorneys to be discourteous.
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Honorable John Doe," but does the conviction for acts of
moral turpitude serve to revoke the "Honorable"? Where
I come from, this is not a theoretical question.
GENTLE READER:
At the rate things are going, we may soon need a set of
regulations spelling out exactly which of the many interest-
ing forms of moral turpitude that our public servants seem
to enjoy indulging in should result in revoking their privi-
lege of being addressed as "Honorable." Miss Manners
will be sorry when that happens. The ironic humor in so
addressing an inmate of a federal penitentiary fills her with
such glee that she is tempted to find out who your former
[judges] are for the sheer pleasure of writing out those
283envelopes.
Legal etiquette is a two-way street. Judges owe attorneys im-
portant obligations,2"4 of which reasonableness and impartiality ap-
pear to be the most important. 28 5 Canon 2(A) of the Code of
283. J. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 708-09.
284. Canon 3(A)(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge should be
patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with
whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and
of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction and control." CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(3). See also Barris, supra note 216, at 506-07 (judges owe
a duty of respect and courtesy to attorneys and the office that they hold).
Although it lies beyond the scope of this article to analyze fully breaches of etiquette
by judges, this section raises a few of the more important issues as they have appeared in
Maryland. For a more complete discussion ofjudicial obligations and breaches of deco-
rum, see Conner, The Trial Judge, His Facial Expressions, Gestures and General Demeanor-
Their Effect on the Administration ofJustice, 9 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 61, 74 (Aug. 1965).
The trial judge has a tremendous influence on the jury, by his conduct, facial
expressions and in the inflexion and deflection of his pronouncement of words,
either in sustaining or overruling objections, by comment to lawyers or his ac-
tions and expressions at the time a witness is testifying-such as a stare at the
witness, frown, scorn, shrug of shoulders or waving of arms or hands by the
judge.
Id. See also Alschuler, supra note 27, at 677-720 (covering the remedies for judicial mis-
conduct and modern disciplinary procedures); Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good
Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE LJ. 1475 (1970) (questioning whether mere breaches of
"good behavior" permit impeachment); Middleton,Judges are People Too; Sometimes It Isn't
Easy, 68 A.B.A.J. 1200 (1982) (discussing whether judges should speak out on issues);
Schwartz,Judges as Tyrants, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 129 (1971) (discussing dictatorial and biased
trial judges).
285. Orderly procedure presumes that a judge is able to be objective, to look
dispassionately at the whole case and to disregard local prejudices, knowledge
of the family or of the defendant himself.. .. Socrates said four things belong
to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly and to
decide impartially.
Wright, supra note 23, at 382.
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Judicial Conduct exhibits the preservation-of-power rationale for et-
iquette by stating that a judge should conduct herself "in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.12' 6 Because of their position in the legal hierarchy,
this power and professionalism rationale for courtroom etiquette
rules is critically undermined and practically meaningless when
judges breach etiquette. There is a direct and immediate impact on
attorneys, parties, and the public when a judge's professional de-
meanor is questioned in court. A judge's bad behavior detracts
from the indispensable perception of fairness and impartiality of the
courts, and these derelictions tend to be well reported by the
media.287
Judges are bound to abide by the Code of Judicial Conduct,
violations of which are punishable by an informal censure,288 formal
reprimand, or removal from office. The objectives of judicial disa-
bility proceedings, and any sanction imposed therein, are to main-
tain "the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the proper
administration of justice rather than the punishment of the individ-
ual."'289  When assessing claims of judicial misconduct, reviewing
courts balance the competing interests of the judicial process: im-
partiality29 ° and the prompt issuance of just decisions, against law-
286. CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (1972). See also Seventh Circuit Report,
supra note 80, at 57-58.
287. See, e.g., Rooney,Judge Censured for Humiliating Student, Chicago Daily L. Bul., Dec.
7, 1989, at 1 (Cook County judge GlynnJ. Elliott, Jr. censured for hand-cuffing a visiting
student to a chair after allegedly creating a disturbance in the courtroom); Moss, Judge
Mrs. the Point, But He Later Apologizes to Woman Lawyer, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1988, at 25
(Federal Judge Hubert Teitelbaum in Pittsburgh apologizes for threatening to send at-
torney to jail for refusing to be addressed by her husband's last name); Cohen, Racial
Slur Draws Complaint, N.J. L.J., Nov. 27, 1986, at 7, at col. 1 (efforts to remove a judge
from office after he made racially derogatory remarks about a black woman at a party).
See also Prodding the Judiciary to Clean Its Own House, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 4, 1978, at 105
(report on attempts to create judicial disciplinary bodies); Now, the States Crack Down on
Bad Judges, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 13, 1978, at 63 (state commissions disciplin-
ing misbehaving judges).
288. See, e.g., In re Turney, 311 Md. 246, 533 A.2d 916 (1987) (Maryland district court
judge's conduct resulted in an appearance of impropriety warranting censure); In re Fos-
ter, 271 Md. 449, 318 A.2d 523 (1974) (judge's conduct in furthering speculative real
estate development project warranted censure).
289. In re Diener & Broccolino, 268 Md. 659, 670, 304 A.2d 587, 594 (1973).
290. The American College of Trial Lawyers stated that judges have a duty
to recognize the obligation of every lawyer to represent his clients coura-
geously and vigorously, and to treat every lawyer with courtesy and respect due
one performing an essential role in the trial process; [and] to avoid becoming
personally involved in any case before him, to preside firmly and impartially,
and to conduct himself in such a way as to prevent, if possible, disorder or
disruption in the courtroom.
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yers' interest in representing their clients zealously.29' Most
authors on topics ofjudicial etiquette agree that to achieve the equi-
table administration of justice, it is necessary for judges always to
maintain a calm, firm, and courteous demeanor.292
But judges may affront standards less exalted than the high dic-
tates of justice. Those who consistently start court late commit
breaches of etiquette against attorneys, witnesses, and the public. 93
One strict Texas judge, who was known to fine tardy lawyers, fined
himself one day when he arrived twelve minutes late.294 He held a
contempt hearing, found himself guilty, and set a $50 fine. The
judge then handed the startled clerk a $50 bill. He said he had no
excuse other than failure to watch his clock closely enough. 295 More
judges should apply etiquette rules to their own behavior in a con-
certed effort to be fair, which, in turn, enhances the power of the
courts.29 6 But the fact is that judges may break etiquette rules more
often and in more ways than attorneys, and in general they let them-
selves get away with it. 2 97 Indeed, appellate judges responding to
the Survey said that they see the evidence of bad behavior in trial
29transcripts. 98 Nonetheless, there have not been many complaints
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 281 (Principle IV, judge's
obligations).
291. See Liner v. State, 62 Md. App. 381, 391-92, 489 A.2d 553, 558 (1985).
292. See Alschuler, supra note 27, at 678; Conner, supra note 284, at 74-8 1; Schwartz,
supra note 284, at 136-37; Note, supra note 23, at 544-51.
293. See Schauble, supra note 183, at 98 (discussing judges who are chronically late in
Baltimore city courts and then complain when attorneys do the same).
294. War Stories, Equal Justice Under the Law, 69 A.B.A.J. 1758 (1983).
295. Id.
296. Anyone who has tried cases is well familiar with the different levels of
courtesy, or lack thereof, extended by some judges to counsel in the court-
room. I often wonder ifjudges are aware of the high respect among lawyers for
judges whose demeanor is marked with courtesy--or the disdain for those
whose demeanor is otherwise.
Whitehurst, judicial Courtesy-A Concern of Young Lawyers, 46 TEx. B.J. 345 (1983).
297. One Maryland judge responded that the main weakness of most judges is to
speak angrily, make sharp remarks, or to reprimand a lawyer in court. See Survey re-
sponse, district court judge, Prince George's County. See also Liner v. State, 62 Md. App.
381, 489 A.2d 553 (1985); Whitehurst, supra note 296, at 345.
Usually, this is the result of misconduct on the part of the attorney. See Survey
response, district court judge, Prince George's County. The judge further commented
that in general, judges commit the following breaches of etiquette: (1) arriving late for
court; (2) impatience on the bench; (3) failing to allow persons to speak to the court; and
(4) acting rudely to attorneys and members working in the court system. Id. To the
contrary, one judge responded that in 28 years on the bench, he observed judges' court-
room etiquette "without exception to be impeccable." Survey response, circuit court
judge, Baltimore City.
298. See, e.g., supra note 247.
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filed by attorneys, as opposed to the public, with the Maryland Judi-
cial Disabilities Commission, 299 possibly because potential com-
plainants fear reprisals. 3°
When it comes to judges' breaches of etiquette and profes-
sional misconduct, the public has an elephantine memory, and
whether justified or not, one judge's conduct can leave a lasting
negative public impression of the judiciary. 30 1 For example, there is
a "growing awareness among judges themselves that gender bias
compromises the public's overall confidence in the judicial sys-
tem.''302 Incivility, rudeness, interruptions, and failures to listen to
the parties can only hurt the legal profession. As the preamble to
the Virginia Principles of Professional Courtesy states,
"[t]houghtful, courteous conduct, manners and attitudes, constantly
practiced by the bench and bar in a symbiotic relationship will improve
both the reality, and the public perception, of the legal system.
30 3
Judges' etiquette and perceived decorum is therefore a crucial factor
in preserving the courts' power and promoting legal
professionalism.
299. One judge noted that "[p]erhaps the existence of the Judicial Disabilities Com-
mission and the fact that nowadays people who perceive themselves to be the victims of
abuse are quick to complain have had a salutary effect on judicial behavior." Survey
response, appellate judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
300. One appellate judge wrote:
In Maryland counties that had only one circuit court judge, i.e., in every juris-
diction except Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Montgomery County, and
Prince George's County, the judge was king, tzar, emperor, feudal overlord.
He ran the county, and ran it his way. Some of those judges were courtly gen-
tleman, or benevolent despots. Lawyers who practiced in some counties, how-
ever, were lucky if they experienced nothing worse than bad manners and
bursts of temper. Sometimes the abuse approached outright tyranny. That too
seems to be a thing of the past.
Survey response, appellate judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Some Maryland
trial attorneys, as well as attorneys in other states, would not necessarily agree with the
latter statement. See, e.g., Schauble, supra note 183, at 95 (discussing the jailing of two
Baltimore attorneys who appeared late after a luncheon recess); see also Liner, 62 Md.
App. 381, 489 A.2d 553; Moss, supra note 287, at 25 (judge apologizes for threatening
to send female attorney to jail for refusing to be addressed by her husband's last name).
301. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying textual quotation. The same event is
also reported in Moss, supra note 287.
302. Blodgett, supra note 123, at 53.
303. VIRGINIA STATE BAR, PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY preamble (1988)
(emphasis added). See also the Seventh Circuit's proposed Preamble, Seventh Circuit
Report, supra note 80, at 53 ("The following standards are designed to encourage us,
lawyers and judges, to meet our obligations to each other, to litigants and to the system
ofjustice, and thereby achieve the twin goals of civility and professionalism, which are
hallmarks of a learned profession dedicated to public service.").
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J. Courtroom "Demean-her"." Gender Bias Related to
Etiquette in the Courts
Another dimension of courtroom behavior related to etiquette
is gender bias, a topic that has attracted considerable attention re-
cently.3 ' 4 Gender discrimination is, at a minimum, a serious breach
of courtroom etiquette. Gender bias is perpetuated against women
appearing in courts as attorneys, jurors, witnesses, and parties; it
works to their disadvantage, and it undermines the impartiality and
overall fairness expected of the legal process.3 °5
A national movement is underway to study and to correct this
problem.306 The Maryland SpecialJoint Committee on Gender Bias
304. See infra note 306.
305. See GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 185, at 107-28. The Committee
reported:
A widespread perception that gender bias affects the process or outcome of
particular cases is important because such bias undermines the image of impar-
tiality which is crucial to the system. Where that perception has a basis in fact,
it is imperative that the judicial system eliminate it in order to protect the repu-
tation of the judiciary for impartiality. In many instances, as this Report docu-
ments, the reports of respondents about gender bias have a basis in fact: it is
true that women suffer a disadvantage in many arenas of the legal system, in
terms of both credibility and case outcome, and it is also true that men suffer a
disadvantage in some custody disputes.
Id. at 109.
306. The New Jersey Supreme Court created the first Task Force on Women in the
Courts. This task force was set up to study the influence of sexist attitudes on the judi-
cial system. A majority of the states have created similar task forces to study bias against
women attorneys. Such task forces are funded by courts, bar associations, and state
legislatures. A.B.A. J., Sept. 1988, at 24. The New Jersey task force released reports in
1984 and 1986 finding that gender bias influenced judges. In 1988, Judge Marilyn Lof-
tus, president of the National Association of Women Judges, stated that the New Jersey
task force reports indicate that "courtroom treatment has changed... [and that] women
are being treated fairly." Id.
The National Center for State Courts, the National Association of Women Judges,
and the William Bingham Foundation held a National Conference on Gender Bias in the
Courts from May 18, 1989 through May 21, 1989. The National Task Force on Gender
Bias in the Courts, chaired by Judge Betty Ellerin, was represented along with 27 state
task forces.
Although members of the New Jersey bar and bench report that there has been a
decline of disparate treatment of women, other states, including Maryland, are just be-
ginning to address the problem of gender bias in the courts. For example, "[i]nterviews
with more than 25 lawyers [in Boston] working in virtually every segment of the profes-
sion found that women are encountering significant discrimination that is prompting
many to rethink their career goals." The Morning Call, Jan. 1, 1989, at E8, col. 3.
Moreover, a study of the New York state court system shows discrimination against wo-
men both as attorneys and as litigants. The New York task force completed a 22-month
study that found that women encounter a "verbal and psychological obstacle course"
upon entering a courtroom. Women were found to be criticized for aggressive behavior
that would have been acceptable in men. See New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts, Report, reprinted in Report, 15 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 8 (1986). See also Czapanskiy,
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in the Courts completed a two-year investigation culminating in a
comprehensive report.3s° The Committee concluded that gender
bias exists in Maryland courts, and "it affects decision-making as
well as participants. '"308
Although judges may not openly categorize gender bias as a
breach of etiquette, one Maryland judge commented that he has
seen breaches of etiquette where male attorneys "speak down" to
female attorneys.3 °9 One female circuit court judge also responded
that in her experience as a practicing attorney, she heard some
judges demean women lawyers by addressing them as "little lady"
or "dear." 0 Some judges apparently act in this manner fre-
quently,31' especially if the woman attorney is relatively young, and
even more so if she happens to be a law clinic student practicing
under the supervision of a licensed attorney.31 2 One Maryland
judge is known to address all female attorneys with the prefix
"Mrs." even when he knows or has been advised that the attorney is
unmarried.
In addition, breaches of etiquette occur that are far more seri-
ous than mere inappropriate tones of voice or forms of address.
"Attorneys reported to the Committee that some judges and law-
yers do not stop with sexist remarks, jokes, or general comments
about the appearance of women lawyers; they make verbal or physi-
cal sexual advances in the course of the professional interaction. 313
It is a breach of courtroom decorum and professionalism for ajudge
to mention an attorney's or witness's gender when it is not relevant
to the proceedings. Clearly, if a male attorney remarked about a
female judge's gender he would commit a serious breach of eti-
Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL Em-ics 1, 2-3 (1990)
(surveying recent state studies of gender bias in the courts).
It is important to note the difference between gender bias task forces, which focus
on the courts and decision-making processes, and state-established special committees
that investigate problems confronting women in the legal profession, that is, law firms,
legal education, and the bar.
307. See GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 185.
308. Id. at i (footnote omitted).
309. Survey response, circuit court judge, Anne Arundel County.
310. Survey response, circuit court judge, Baltimore City.
311. Male attorneys surveyed by the Special Committee on Gender Bias responded
that judges have referred to female attorneys as "honey" or "babe." See GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS, supra note 185, at 121; see also id. at 123 (discussing how judges informally
address women, and not their male counterparts, as "hon," "dear," "baby doll,"
"honey," and "sweetheart").
312. See MD. RuL~s 18 (1991) (allowing law students, certified by the dean of their law
schools, to practice law in Maryland courts).
313. GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 185, at 125.
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quette and would probably merit a reprimand or sanction."1 4
Some judges hold women lawyers to a higher standard of eti-
quette than their male counterparts. One female attorney respond-
ing to the survey on gender bias in the courts said that "[t]hejudges
also tend to reprimand women attorneys for the slightest... breach
of decorum while failing to comment on the most blatant breaches
by male attorneys. 31 5 This double standard exists not only in
Maryland but in a majority of state courts.3 1 6 References to an-
other's sexuality are also obvious breaches of etiquette to be
avoided by all attorneys, judges, and court personnel in order to
maintain impartiality.
Gender-neutral interactions between lawyers and judges are
supported by the theoretical justifications underlying etiquette stan-
dards. For example, a judge's comments about a woman's appear-
ance, even if complimentary, undermine a woman's credibility and
deny her equal treatment if no similar comment is made to male
attorneys.3 1i Etiquette rules that restrict conduct and unnecessary
commentary from both the bench and bar, further the goal of gen-
der-neutrality in courtrooms by fairly placing all parties on equal
ground. This in turn will promote respect for the courts' judgments
in the eyes of all participants and will legitimize the power of the
judicial process in society.318
V. TEACHING COURTROOM ETIQUETTE
A. Legal Institutiom Called to Educate Lawyers
Enhanced professionalism, including courtroom etiquette, has
become the modern quest of the late 1980s and early 1990s. t9
314. The Special Committee on Gender Bias was also informed "about a male lawyer
who refers to female judges as well as attorneys as 'babes' and 'broads.'" GENDER BIAs
IN THE COURTS, supra note 185, at 123 n.46.
315. GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 185, at 121 (footnote omitted); see also
Blodgett, supra note 123, at 48, 49 (stating that women have to fight harder for respect
and that they are presumed incompetent until proven competent).
316. See generally supra note 306 (for discussion of The National Task Force on Gender
Bias in the Courts).
317. See Blodgett, supra note 123, at 52 (judge's compliments on attire or appearance
"undercuts the woman's attempt to gain an equal measure of respect").
318. See GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, supra note 185, at 111-16 (giving examples of
improper remarks by judges and male attorneys, which promote perceptions of unfair-
ness by parties and witnesses).
319. This professionalism movement is broader in scope than courtroom etiquette
methodologies, but these are often a subpart of the professionalism reports. For exam-
ple, the professionalism report of the Vermont Bar Association recommended courtesy
guidelines similar to those a Texas federal district court imposed, which were written by
1991] 1011
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Since 1987, over a dozen states have written professionalism re-
ports.3 2 0 Numerous state and local bar associations have written
codes, creeds, tenets, and guidelines of legal etiquette. 321 The
American Bar Association's Commission on Professionalism sup-
ports the current efforts by state and local bar associations to im-
prove professional conduct among attorneys.3 22 Education is a
major component of these undertakings.
As in any educational process, the theoretical and practical jus-
tifications in support of etiquette codes of conduct should be dis-
cerned; otherwise, the call for greater professionalism will ring
hollow and the procedures appear meaningless to practitioners.
The initial training and later reinforcement of these skills requires
an ongoing and concerted effort afforded by judges, law firms, bar
associations, and law schools. "Lessons of professionalism should
be taught to law students, then reinforced with new lawyers and re-
visited with experienced advocates . ".3.."'23 Only then will profes-
sional behavior become second nature.
1. Judges as Educators.-Judges have an ongoing responsibility
for setting the standards of etiquette in courtrooms and for inform-
the Dallas Bar Association. See supra note 31. The Vermont Bar Association's report
went so far as to include a recommendation that the Vermont Supreme Court adopt a
new rule requiring supervisors of law clerks to certify to the court that they reviewed the
courtesy guidelines with their clerks. See Bowser, supra note 9, at 13.
320. The following state and local bar associations have published full professional-
ism reports that are either in addition to, or separate from, the codes of professional
conduct: ARKANSAS BAR, PROFESSIONALISM IN ARKANSAS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM.
ON PROFESSIONALISM (1989); FLORIDA BAR, PROFESSIONALISM: A RECOMMITMENT OF THE
BENCH, THE BAR, AND THE LAW SCHOOLS OF FLORIDA (1989); STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,
REPORT OF THE COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM (1986); ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASS'N, THE BAR,
THE BENCH & PROFESSIONALISM IN ILLINOIS: PROUD TRADITIONS, TOUGH NEW PROBLEMS,
CURRENT CHOICES (1987); INDIANA STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON
PROFESSIONALISM (1988); INDIANAPOLIS BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRO-
FESSIONALISM (1987); KENTUCKY BAR Ass'N, REPORT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
(1989); MISSOURI BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM
(1988); CLEVEI AND (OHIO) BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL-
ISM (1988); ALLEGHENY COUNTY (PA.) BAR, PROFESSIONALISM-A REPORT TO THE CIVIL
LITIGATION COUNCIL OF THE ALLEGHENY BAR COUNTY BAR Ass'N (1989); PENNSYLVANIA
BAR AsS'N REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM (1989);
VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASS'N, SPECIAL REPORT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986); WEST
VIRGINIA STATE BAR, COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM REPORT TO THE BOARD OF Gov-
ERNORS (undated).
321. See supra note 10.
322. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 12-15 (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D.
243, 263-64 (1986).
323. Can Good Lawyers Be Nice People?, supra note 29, at 34.
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ing attorneys of what conduct is appropriate. According to one
commentator, "[]udges [used to help] the young lawyers who came
into the community to grow into those standards. Judges are too
busy today."' 2 4 Although lawyers encounter judges late in their
legal training, judges hold an influential position that they can use
to improve professionalism by advising attorneys on trial practice
methods and on the way attorneys handle themselves in the court-
room. For example, the failure to stand when addressing the court
is a consistent breach of courtroom etiquette noted by several Mary-
land judges." 5 One judge assigned primary responsibility for this
prevalent breach to state court judges "who allow this sort of thing
on a wholesale basis."3 2 6
A few state and federal courts have taken measures to educate
lawyers by formally adopting court rules on etiquette procedures.3 7
In 1987, the Supreme Court of Kansas adopted rule 161, which fo-
cuses on courtroom decorum, and is among the broadest rules in
existence.3 2 8 The first sentence of this rule reflects the theoretical
justification of preserving the respect and professionalism of court-
room proceedings: "[tihe conduct and demeanor ... shall reflect
respect for the dignity and authority of the court.' 3 2' 9 The second
clause of the court rule reflects the fairness justification: "the pro-
ceedings shall be maintained as an objective search for the applica-
ble facts and the correct principles of law."330 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas took a unique ap-
proach to professional conduct education, publishing an opinion
formally adopting the Dallas Bar Association's Guidelines of Profes-
sional Courtesy.3 3  The court made clear its intent to curb future
abuses in trial tactics and lawyers' unprofessional behavior.33
There are examples of more detailed, practice-oriented court-
room etiquette rules formally adopted by courts in their efforts to
educate lawyers on professional conduct.33 3 Although the three
324. D'Alemberte, supra note 6, at 52-53.
325. See supra subpart IV (A).
326. Survey response, circuit court judge, Montgomery County.
327. See RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS (1987); RULES FOR UNIFORM DECO-
RUM IN THE DISTRICT (TRIAL) COURTS OF MINNESOTA (1990); RULES OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND (1991).
328. See RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS Rule 161 (1987).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284,
287-89 (N.D. Texas 1988); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
332. See Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 288.
333. See, e.g., RULES FOR UNIFORM DECORUM IN THE DISTRICT (TRIAL) COURTS OF MIN-
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theoretical justifications are apparent throughout the rules of most
jurisdictions, 3 4 each set of court rules exhibits at least one overrid-
ing theoretical justification. 3 5 For example, the major emphasis of
the Minnesota rules for uniform decorum is on professionalism in
the courtroom. 3 6
The Minnesota rules detail the professional conduct required of
all court participants including the jury, the bailiff, the clerk, the law-
yers, and the judge.3 7 The Minnesota rules address even purely
visual concerns, such as displaying a flag in each courtroom3 38 and
removing hats or overcoats before entering the courtroom. 33 9 The
rules also include the exact wording to be used by the bailiff in call-
ing the courtroom to order at the beginning of the day and when
reconvening during the day.3 4 ° Moreover, the rules limit the proper
form of address for a judge to "Your Honor" or "The Court."-3 4 '
The Minnesota court rules state that the "lawyer should never lean
upon the bench nor appear to engage the court in a familiar man-
ner,"3 42 which emphasizes the concern with formality and, by infer-
ence, the preservation of the respect and power of the court. These
rules go so far as to demand that the manner of administering an
oath to jurors or witnesses should be "dignified" and "should be an
impressive ceremony and not a mere formality. 3 43
By comparison, the local rules for the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland reflect an overriding emphasis on
promoting efficiency.3 44 The federal court rules mandate a pretrial
conference where trial attorneys must be "familiar with all aspects of
the case" and "be prepared to discuss proposals for the orderly pres-
NESOTA (1990); RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MARYLAND (1991).
334. See, e.g., RULES FOR UNIFORM DECORUM IN THE DISTRICT (TRIAL) COURTS OF MIN-
NESOTA Rules 1, 4, 10, 11, 13-14 (preserving power and professionalism), 20, 27 (fair-
ness), 21, 25 (efficiency).
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. See id. rules 7 (jury), 8 (bailiff), 10 (clerk), 11-22 (lawyer), 23-33.
338. See id. rule 1.
339. See id. rule 2.
340. See id. rules 4 & 5.
341. See id. rule 13.
342. See id. rule 14; see also id. rule 16 (stating that "[l]awyers, during trial, shall not
exhibit undue familiarity with witnesses, jurors, or opposing counsel, and the use of first
names shall be avoided").
343. Id. rule 10 (emphasis added).
344. See RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARY-
LAND (1991).
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entation of the exhibits at trial."' s4 5 These Maryland federal court
rules require pretrial numbering of exhibits, advance court filing of
an exhibit list, and opposing counsel's review of exhibits to prevent
unnecessary delay at trial.3 4 Rule 107 outlines courtroom proce-
dures at trial with particular emphasis on furthering efficiency in the
actual trial process.3 47 Under subsection 107.5.b, if exhibits are cir-
culated to the jury, counsel "shall be expected to continue with
questioning of the witness while the exhibit is being circulated. 3 s4
This rule also establishes one-hour time limits for opening and clos-
ing statements and allows the judge, after consultation with the at-
torneys, to impose reasonable time limits on the presentation of
evidence.349 The relation between courtroom etiquette and the the-
ory of efficiency is further illuminated in subsection 107.9, which
specifically addresses courtroom etiquette.350 The rule requires
counsel to stand when addressing the court but also contains an ex-
ception in the interests of efficiency: counsel need not stand for
"stating brief evidentiary objections."'35' Subsection 107.9 differs
from other, more formalism-oriented etiquette codes, in that "coun-
sel may approach a witness to show an exhibit without prior approval
of the Court."352 Once again, Maryland's federal district court rules
are designed to expedite the trial process where time-saving con-
duct can be accommodated without degradation of the trial process
and professionalism.
By formally adopting rules of courtroom etiquette, the judiciary
accepts responsibility for educating lawyers, clerks, witnesses, juries,
and the general public on proper courtroom conduct. Publication
and open discussion of the rationales underlying rules of courtroom
conduct allow judges to become educators and active participants in
cultivating improved professionalism.
345. Id. rule 106.6. (emphasis added).
346. See id. rule 106.7.a, b.
347. See id. rule 107.5, 8.
348. Id. rule 107.5.b.
349. See id. rule 107.8.a, b.
350. See id. rule 107.9.
351. Id. rule 107.9.a.
352. Id. rule 107.9.b.ii (emphasis added). Section 107.10 also exposes the goals of
order and efficiency that justify these rules of courtroom etiquette: only one attorney
can examine a witness and only one attorney can object to questions by opposing coun-
sel. See id. rule 107.10. Rule 107.11 establishes the order of examining witnesses and
presenting arguments where co-parties are represented by different counsel-they must
follow the order in which they are named in the complaint. See id. rule 107.11.
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2. Law Firms as Educators.-Because a majority of law school
graduates enter private practice, private law firms share the obliga-
tion to educate attorneys on courtroom conduct and broader con-
cepts of professionalism. One of the most compelling reasons for
law firms to participate in this educational process is that firms often
have available resources to educate young attorneys. Many law
firms have either formal or informal mentoring programs, which
provide young lawyers with experienced attorneys to serve as advi-
sors and professional role models. Professionalism education can
occur in the offices and hallways of law firms just as easily as it can in
the courtroom or at local bar association meetings-perhaps even
more effectively because of the added pressure to gain professional
approbation of colleagues. Trial preparation also presents an op-
portunity to teach courtroom etiquette. The newest trial tools for
the larger private law firms of the 1990s are sleek mock courtrooms
built inside firms.353 Mock courtrooms in some firms have been de-
scribed as elaborate, formal courtrooms complete with an American
flag, a judge's bench, video control rooms, and walls made of
burnished wood and polished black granite 3 54 -a superior environ-
ment to familiarize attorneys with the unfamiliar formal rules of
courtroom etiquette and professional conduct. The courtrooms
cost anywhere between $10,000 to $150,000, and are used to con-
duct mock trials so that lawyers can examine witnesses, give opening
and closing statements to colleagues, and make objections while
others on the trial team watch, videotape, and critique their peers'
performances.3 55
Another education option also available to smaller law firms is
sponsoring lawyers' attendance at professional trial practice training
seminars. For example, the National Institute for Trial Advocacy
(NITA) conducts trial advocacy training programs, which adopt the
"learning by doing approach" where lawyers refine their advocacy
skills under close supervision of experienced attorneys.3 5 6
Although NITA programs address the "nuts and bolts" of trial ad-
353. Torry, Mock Courtrooms are the Latest Tool in the Quest to Impress, Wash. Post, Jan. 21,
1991, at F5, col. 1. "[Tlhe courtroom has multiple uses-conference room and lecture
hall; training for associates; and a great recruiting tool. And in the lucrative world of
law, the cost is relatively small ... between $60,000 and $150,000." Id.
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. The NITA brochure states that the purpose of NITA is "to contribute to the
development of an adequately trained, professionally responsible trial bar, sufficient to
serve the needs ofjustice in the United States." See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITuTE FOR TRIAL
ADVOCACY, INTENSIVE SKILLS PROGRAM IN TRIAL ADVOCACY.
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vocacy skills, some decorum and stylistic skills have been included as
a part of the instruction at the discretion of the program directors.
Law firms should actively participate in the etiquette revival and in
educational efforts to prevent incivility and declining public opinion
of the legal profession.357
3. State and Local Bar Associations as Educators.-
a. Three General Approaches of State and Local Bar Associations.-
Bar associations constitute the core of the movement to educate
lawyers in issues of etiquette and professionalism. Etiquette rules or
professional courtesy codes adopted by state bar associations vary
widely in length, detail, and focus. There are basically three ap-
proaches taken by state and local bar associations to educate attor-
neys. The first approach focuses on the early introduction of law
students to professionalism concerns of the bar.3 58 The approach is
a preventative measure designed to have future long-term impact
rather than more direct impact on current practitioners.3 5 9 This is
the approach adopted by Maryland. s
A second approach is the institutionalization of professionalism
oversight either by permanent committees or by permanent employ-
ees of a commission on professionalism. For example, after a two-
year study, the Indiana State Bar Association concluded that profes-
sionalism is not manageable by one temporary committee and
therefore established a permanent committee to conduct ongoing
studies "as the practice of law adapts to change.
3 6 1
357. See Sansing, supra note 104, at 132. A magazine survey conducted of area resi-
dents "indicated that they consider lawyers much less trustworthy than physicians, po-
lice, dentists, and teachers. Respondents also felt that there are too many lawyers, and
that lawyers are primarily interested in making money." id. at 133, 137.
358. The Vermont Bar Association's report calls for curriculum in the Vermont Law
School to be devoted to issues of professionalism in law practice. Peter Hall, Chair of
the Commission on the Vermont Lawyer stated: "In the law schools we hope to get at
the issue before it becomes a problem.... We're trying to deal with ethics and courtesy
so that the concepts become second nature." Bowser, supra note 9, at 13. The Florida
Bar Association reports that they offer a course to recent bar admittees called "Bridge
the Gap." The curriculum touches on some professionalism issues and the Florida Stan-
dards of Professional Courtesy.
359. See Bowser, supra note 9, at 13.
360. See infra subsection V(A)(3)(b).
361. INDIANA STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM
(1988). Bar associations are not alone in this effort to institutionalize legal professional-
ism. The Supreme Court of Georgia has also institutionalized professionalism oversight
by hiring a paid staff member to head the Georgia Supreme Court Chief Justice's Com-
mission on Professionalism and also by mandating that all lawyers take one continuing
legal education credit hour on professionalism. See Bowser, supra note 9, at 12, 14.
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The third approach is to focus the professionalism education on
"rank and file lawyers" who are current practitioners.3 6 2 To achieve
this, a widely accepted approach has been for state and local bar
associations (and sometimes courts) to supplement the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility with written voluntary codes of courtesy and
professionalism that are printed and distributed to all members of
the bar. 6 ' Each of these codes uniquely reflects some or all of the
theoretical justifications for the adoption of decorum standards.
For example, part one of the creed drafted by the Dallas Bar Associ-
ation reflects the preservation-of-power theory: "I revere the law,
the System, and the Profession, and I pledge that in my private and
professional life, and in my dealings with fellow members of the Bar,
I will uphold the dignity and respect of each in my behavior toward
others."' 64 Part two reflects the fairness justification: "In all deal-
ings with fellow members of the Bar, I will be guided by a funda-
mental sense of integrity and fair play; I know that effective
advocacy does not mean hitting below the belt. '" '65 Moreover, the
efficiency justification appears throughout the creed. For example,
part six states: "I will readily stipulate to undisputed facts in order
to avoid needless costs or inconvenience for any party."'66
Some state codes include generalized language and address
courtroom decorum only briefly. For example, the Los Angeles
County Bar Association Litigation Guidelines contain only two
guidelines for courtroom conduct. The first rule reflects the effi-
ciency theory: "[c]ounsel should be punctual and prepared for any
court appearance, 3 67 and the second sets forth the very generalized
professionalism concern that "[c]ounsel should always deal with
parties, counsel, witnesses, jurors or prospective jurors, court per-
sonnel and the judge with courtesy and civility." 68 Other codes re-
flect this more sweeping, aspirational tone as well.3 6 9
362. See Bowser, supra note 9, at 13.
363. See supra note 10. The Dallas Bar Association Lawyer's Creed states: "I recog-
nize that my conduct is not governed solely by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
but also by standards of fundamental decency and courtesy." DALLAS BAR ASS'N, LAW-
YER'S CREED (Oct. 15, 1987), reprinted in Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Texas 1988).
364. Dondi Properties, 121 F.R.D. at 294.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N, LITIGATION GUIDELINES 12 (Apr. 1989).
368. Id.
369. See, e.g., HOUSTON BAR ASS'N, PROFESSIONALISM: A LAWYER'S MANDATE (1989).
The mandate contains a general statement of purpose: "The conduct of a lawyer should
be characterized at all times by honesty, candor, and fairness. In fulfilling his or her
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The Virginia Principles of Professional Courtesy are the most
narrowly drawn. 370 The principles address courtesy toward the
court, courtesy toward other counsel, courtesy toward the court
clerk and staff, and courtesy toward the press.3 7' The Virginia code
goes to the greatest length to restrict courtroom conduct; for exam-
ple, there is even a principle that states "lawyers should make it a
practice to shake hands with opposing counsel at the conclusion of
the trial."5s7 1 Surprisingly, it also calls for lawyers who know of a
potentially embarrassing situation that may arise in court to give
timely "advice" to the court 73 and to be tolerant of "inept" oppos-
ing counsel.3 74
Virginia's Principles of Professional Courtesy, although com-
plete, may be both too extensive and too limited in their approach
to professionalism guidelines. Standards vary from one court to an-
other despite the goal of establishing general guidelines. In addi-
tion, they present a danger of being too restrictive because of
possible infringements on attorneys' trial tactics and personal
style.375
b. Maryland State Bar Approach to Education.-Failure to abide by
unwritten codes of etiquette generally reflects ignorance of the
rules, rather than a conscious disregard of courtroom etiquette. 76
The new requirement in Maryland that all new bar admittees take a
course on professionalism demonstrates one state's attempt to com-
bat such ignorances3 77
primary duty to a client, a lawyer must be ever mindful of the profession's broader duty
to the legal system." It also contains guidelines governing relations with clients, rela-
tions with other lawyers, conduct in court, and the administration ofjustice and discov-
ery. Part three governing courtroom conduct reflects the professionalism justification
by calling for lawyers to conduct themselves in a professional manner and demonstrate
"respect for the Court and law." The Houston code also states that attorneys "will ad-
vise [their] client of the behavior expected of him or her" while in court. Id.
370. See generally VIRGINIA STATE BAR, PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (1988).
371. See id.
372. Id. art. II (n)(x).
373. Id. art. I (o).
374. Id. art. 11 (o).
375. Aware of this inherent danger, the Los Angeles County Bar Association stated in
its preamble that its litigation guidelines "simply reflect our best effort at encouraging
decency and courtesy in our professional lives without intruding unreasonably on each
lawyer's choice of style or tactics." Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N, LITIGATION GUIDE-
LINES (Apr. 1989).
376. "[T]he only breaches of courtroom etiquette that I have observed are minor
ones which appear to be caused by unfamiliarity with appropriate courtroom etiquette."
Survey response, circuit court judge, Prince George's County.
377. See RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND 11 (1991).
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Maryland's course on professionalism is not the first of its kind
offered by a state bar association. One of the most recently devel-
oped courses is the state of Virginia's mandatory course on profes-
sionalism, offered as a collaborative effort by the Virginia State Bar
and the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Virginia program, how-
ever, is really a course on professional responsibility, rather than a
course on professional conduct and courtroom etiquette stan-
dards. 78 The latter part of the Virginia course focuses on the law-
yer's professional obligation to the court, relationships with other
attorneys, and the lawyer's obligation to the profession and commu-
nity. It is unclear whether the Maryland course will focus on the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility as does the Virginia
course, or whether it will focus primarily on etiquette and profes-
sionalism guidelines in and out of the courtroom.
While the Maryland course on professionalism represents a
laudable effort to improve professionalism in Maryland, it is mis-
placed. First, the course is not directed toward the most appropri-
ate audience. The real "offenders" (who served as the basis for
judges' observations discussed throughout this Article) are not the
recently successful candidates for the Maryland bar, but are the cur-
rent practitioners. Conceivably, it is those who have been practicing
for several years that should attend a professionalism course to re-
fresh and heighten their awareness of current professionalism stan-
dards. 79 Second, the timing is not advantageous. Having spent
three years (or more) in law school, attended a costly bar review
course, and successfully completed the bar examination, the new ad-
mittees will only reluctantly return to the classroom to learn how to
become a "professional." More likely than not, a majority of the
admittees will consider the course an insignificant and inconvenient
hurdle before the swearing-in ceremony-particularly when there is
no grade attached. Finally, the classroom is not the best environ-
ment for teaching these skills, nor is it an efficient use of resources.
378. For example, the Virginia Course on Professionalism is closely based on the Dis-
ciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The course materials address
issues of professional responsibility. See VIRGINIA STATE BAR COURSE ON PROFESSIONAL-
ISM (1989-90) (course materials). The Virginia course addresses, among other topics:
business development; fee arrangements; handling clients' funds; conflicts of interest;
competence; maintaining clients; terminating employment; and confidences. It is only
the latter part of the course that focuses on the lawyer's obligation as a professional to
the court and the lawyer's obligation to the profession and the community. See generally
id. at topics 4, 6, 7 and 8.
379. At the very least, if Maryland does adopt professionalism guidelines, copies of
the guidelines should be sent to all members of the bar.
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The Maryland professionalism course reflects the Maryland
courts' concern with the preservation of power and professionalism
in the practice of law rather than the efficiency or fairness justifica-
tions for courtroom etiquette. It demonstrates the Maryland courts'
desire to inculcate a new set of legal minds who will breath new life
into the ideas of the legal "profession"-implying that those who
have become lawyers in the past few years have forgotten, or never
learned, the basic components of professionalism. If efficiency was
the major concern, then the course would be directed at all bar
members throughout Maryland-not only recent admittees-be-
cause it is the current practitioners who are now committing
breaches of etiquette. If the Maryland courts' goal was to improve
at once existing professional conduct so that proceedings would be
more orderly and less obstreperous, then education would be neces-
sary for all lawyers, not only the new members, many of whom will
not litigate cases in court for several years. Moreover, new bar ad-
mittees have not (yet) developed bad habits. Their lack of experi-
ence means they lack practical reference points with which to
assimilate the information provided in this professionalism course.
A better approach is a dual approach: first, to support im-
proved education in the law schools, as discussed below; and, sec-
ond, to re-educate or reinforce professionalism concepts among
current Maryland practitioners. This latter group should be
targeted in the same manner recently used by the District of Colum-
bia Bar in the new Rules of Professional Conduct that became
effective in January of 1991. Although these new rules are more
comprehensive than many professionalism codes, the District of Co-
lumbia is engaged in a broader movement, as compared to the
Maryland professionalism course, to educate all lawyers in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. The president of the District of Columbia Bar has
stated that copies of the rules have been sent to all members, ex-
planatory materials can be purchased at a minimal cost, and there
will be twelve to fifteen no-cost seminars offered locally, in addition
to speakers for interested groups of lawyers.3 80 Compared to the
Maryland approach, this broad-based approach to professionalism
education reaches more attorneys who are faced with professional-
ism issues on a daily basis, as well as new admittees to the bar.
By raising consciousness levels among all attorneys, the goals of
efficiency and fairness are at once furthered because efforts target
380. See Meet the President Sara-Ann Determan, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER, Nov./Dec.
1990, at 54.
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the current actors, who are the alleged "culprits." '81 An inevitable
result to flow from this broad-based approach adopted by the Dis-
trict of Columbia is the preservation of professionalism and power.
If there is a positive public perception of the individual components:
the law, lawyers, judges, witnesses, jurors, and all others involved,
the legal system as a whole will be perceived as a trustworthy, or-
derly, and equitable process, resulting in a greater number of indi-
viduals who will turn to the courts for dispute resolution and
protection of legal rights.
B. A Better Teaching Methodology: The Law School-Centered Approach
State and local bar associations have been the leaders in educat-
ing lawyers on issues of professionalism and courtroom etiquette.
This suggests that law schools are not educating lawyers on these
issues. "Far too many lawyers seem to believe that once they
donned the 'attorney-at-law' mantle, they doffed what remnants of
common decency had not been stripped from them by three years of
law school."'38 2 Although education and reinforcement of these
skills should exist at all levels, the primary burden of informing law-
yers of these issues should be placed on the law schools.
The responsibility should lie in the hands of legal educators be-
cause many students enter law school misinformed by television and
movie images of lawyers. Their misconceptions must first be cor-
rected in law school. 383 Law professors have the first and best
chance to teach young students that "order in the court" is basic to
the mechanisms ofjustice.3 14 "Someone must teach that good man-
ners, disciplined behavior and civility-by whatever name-are the
lubricants that prevent lawsuits from turning into combat. More
than that it is really the very glue that keeps an organized society
from flying apart. 385
There is merit to the claim that courtroom etiquette relies on
basic manners and skills that should have been learned in childhood
and are not properly part of a law school's curriculum. 38 6 Neverthe-
381. See generally Sansing, supra note 104.
382. Lytton, Personal Viewpoint: The Uncivil Practice of Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 388, 388 (1982).
383. See Martin, supra note 28, at 166.
384. See The Necessity for Civility, supra note 23, at 214-15.
385. Id.
386. Ralph Waldo Emerson might agree that these are skills that cannot be taught.
I have seen an individual whose manners, though wholly within the con-
ventions of elegant society, were never learned there, but were original and
commanding... ; one who did not need the aid of a court-suit, but carried the
holiday in his eye; who exhilarated the fancy by flinging wide the doors of new
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less, a number ofjudges voiced a concern over the lack of training in
courtroom behavior. Although experienced lawyers ignore eti-
quette rules in the name of efficiency, there is dissatisfaction with
young attorneys' poor law-school instruction on the basics of court-
room conduct and legal professionalism. Assuming it is possible to
engage in "consciousness raising" in the law school curriculum, 8 7
then what is the best teaching methodology?
Several etiquette consciousness raising methods are available to
legal educators. For example, one state report on professionalism
proposes that law professors serve as role models for students.38 8
At a minimum, an awareness of expected standards of professional-
ism should exist at every level of law school training. Undoubtedly,
the traditional socratic method would be ineffective in teaching the
practical, professional skills of courtroom decorum. Likewise, simu-
lation courses, a viable alternative for schools lacking a clinic, would
present the information in too sterile an environment and have a
diluted impact on the law students. Unlike rules of evidence or civil
procedure, problems of courtroom etiquette are difficult to simulate
because they deal with nebulous behavioral relationships with
judges, juries, witnesses, clients, and opposing counsel.
Clinical legal education is the most appropriate way to sensitize
students to etiquette skills and raise future lawyers' awareness of
these codes of courtroom conduct.389 By adding more substantive
training, practice, observation, and critique of etiquette skills in the
clinical curriculum, law schools can force consciousness raising in an
environment meant to do just that. Practicing these skills in a
clinical setting, with the assistance of trained supervisors, will radi-
cally increase law students' etiquette awareness. In time, this train-
ing will move them to internalize standards of courtroom behavior
modes of existence; who shook off the captivity of etiquette, with happy spirited
bearing, good natured and free as Robin Hood; yet with the port of an em-
peror, if need be--calm, serious and fit to stand the gaze of millions.
R.W. EMERSON, supra note 87, at 398.
387. See generally C. MACKINNON, supra note 135, at 83-105 (feminist belief that wo-
men's conscience is best raised in an environment free from male influence).
388. See MISSOURI BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMM, ON PROFESSIONALISM A-3
(1988).
389. See generally Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEo. L.J. 875, 890-91
(1985) (lawyers require a wide variety of qualities to be effective). It is especially impor-
tant for any student who wishes to become a litigator to have observed the decorum of a
real trial and to have learned the proper modes of conduct in the courtroom. Law stu-
dents should learn and refine their courtroom advocacy skills by appearing in court with
a supervising attorney in a clinic setting, or at a minimum, be required to observe a
variety of trials.
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that will improve the efficiency, fairness, and public image of the
legal profession.
Little or no attention... is given to teaching the ambi-
tious law student how to balance the use of his advocacy
skills with those fundamental notions of fair play and po-
liteness that make life and the practice of law so much more
pleasant. When one has finished law school and is im-
mersed in the high stakes practice of law, the righteously
indignant demeanor becomes more easily affected than
simple common decency. o°
The University of Maryland School of Law has already insti-
tuted a unique curriculum requirement to educate its law students
in this area. All University of Maryland day-division law students
must complete a Legal Theory and Practice course, including a sub-
stantial clinical experience, prior to graduation.3 9 1 The clinic re-
quirement, which addresses poverty law issues and the allocation of
legal resources in society, provides the opportunity for law students
to work with real clients. This curriculum requirement offers an ex-
emplary opportunity to educate Maryland law students on court-
room etiquette skills.
If clinical legal education is unavailable in a law school curricu-
lum, an alternative approach is to require law students to observe
the day-to-day workings of a real courtroom.9 2 The courtroom is
the proper forum for future lawyers to learn the art of effective ad-
vocacy and courtroom etiquette. 93 Law schools are obliged to their
students and future clients to raise would-be lawyers' awareness that
courtroom etiquette rules exist and that failure to observe them may
harm a client's representation.
The etiquette rules discussed above affect very practical profes-
sional skills, which ought to be internalized in time with practice and
familiarity. The goal should be to increase awareness among attor-
390. Lytton, supra note 382, at 388.
391. The students work with clinic clients during the second semester of their first
year or the first semester of their second year. See SCHOOL OF LAW 1990-91 UNIVERSITY
OF MARYLAND AT BALTIMORE 54, 75 (school catalogue).
392. Students learn first-hand the disparate levels of attorney representation and con-
duct in and around courtrooms. Observation, however, should not replace the goal of
providing students with "actual client" clinical legal education, which is the best way to
learn practical and necessary skills.
393. "[A] secret formula not taught in most law school litigation skills clinics that can
improve the kinder and gentler quotient in Big Town, U.S.A. courtrooms . .. [is] that
golden stratagem-'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you!!!' " Kuttner
& Birkett, Can Fair Play, Ethics and Civility Thrive in the Courtroom Arena?, N.J. LJ., Feb. 23,
1989, at 10, col. 1.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50:945
MISSED MANNERS IN COURTROOM DECORUM
neys that certain types of conduct are expected and that others are
simply unprofessional. More important, recent law graduates and
experienced lawyers alike should understand that, in the long term,
professional conduct furnishes benefits to both them and the bar by
advancing fairness in judicial proceedings; preserving the integrity
and power of the judicial system; and fostering efficiency and order.
In more practical terms, their clients will be afforded a better chance
of receiving a fair hearing and lawyers and the legal system will
regain some of the public respect that has disintegrated in recent
years.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legal etiquette including promptness, forms of address, know-
ing when to stand or sit, when to be quiet, and the formalities for
introducing evidence, are basic skills essential to practicing trial at-
torneys. Unfortunately, these standards of etiquette are unclear,
often unwritten and merely assumed, and change from one court-
room to the next. From a practical standpoint, a lawyer who fails to
maintain decorum with opposing counsel and the bench is not serv-
ing his or her client's interests. Moreover, the recent outcry for
standards of legal professionalism throughout the United States and
the growing number of attorneys who practice in several courts evi-
dences the need for all state and federal courts to establish written
rules of courtroom etiquette and procedure to maintain profession-
alism, fairness, and efficiency in the proceedings. These rules or
codes, however, should be viewed as only aspirational standards,
separate and distinct from the more important Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.
Perhaps after the current outcry for renewed professionalism
has settled, respect among members of the bar will spread beyond
the courtroom to other corners of our legal system--or perhaps it
has already begun:
DEAR MISS MANNERS:
I was recently a suspect in the arson of my home. The accusa-
tion was unfounded, but while being questioned by the local authori-
ties, I kept my wits about me enough to notice that the policemen
invariably addressed me by my first name after introducing them-
selves as "Detective Bubblehead" or "Detective Slow. " I found this
familiarity offensive, but I was, understandably, a trifle timid about
making my displeasure known at the time. Is it correct for the police
to address adult suspects by their first names? Should I have asked
their first names and used them? Or should I have told them I pre-
1991] 1025
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ferred the use of my surname to the informality of "Where were you
at four-thirty, Jan?"
GENTLE READER:
As a matter of etiquette, the police were quite wrong to address
you by your first name. As a practical matter, you were quite right to
assume that it would not be a good idea for a suspected arsonist to
correct the manners of the arresting officers. However, now that you
are cleared, Miss Manners hopes you will take the trouble to lodge a
complaint, for the good it may do to future suspects who feel the
restraint that you did. The suspicion that you burned your house
down does not entitle police to belittle your dignity.39 4
394. J. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 45.
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